EPA Rulemaking Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act: The Need for Reform by McCoid, Jennifer
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 23 | Issue 1 Article 7
9-1-1995
EPA Rulemaking Under the Regulatory Flexibility
Act: The Need for Reform
Jennifer McCoid
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College
Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jennifer McCoid, EPA Rulemaking Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act: The Need for Reform, 23 B.C.
Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 203 (1995), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol23/iss1/7
EPA RULEMAKING UNDER THE REGULATORY 
FLEXIBILITY ACT: THE NEED FOR REFORM 
Jennifer McCoid* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As originally enacted, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 
(RFA)l modified the federal executive agency rule-making process by 
requiring agencies to examine, and seek to reduce, the impact of any 
rules the agencies promulgate on small businesses and other small 
entities.2 In passing the RFA, Congress found that federal regulations 
were applied uniformly to small and large businesses regardless of 
the size of the regulated entities.3 The uniform application of regula-
tions, Congress found, retarded the development of small businesses.4 
Small businesses are disadvantaged because their regulatory costs 
are proportionately larger than the costs of large businesses, which 
can spread compliance costs over a larger output.5 Another problem 
caused by the uniform application of regulations is that small busi-
nesses do not have the legal, economic, or technical personnel or the 
resources to achieve regulatory compliance economies of scale.6 Con-
* Managing Editor, 1995-1996, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
15 U.S.C. §§ 601-12 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
2 See Doris S. Freedman et aI., The Regulatory Flexibility Act: Orienting Federal Regulation 
to Small Business, 93 DICK. L. REV. 439, 441 (1989); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REGU-
LATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT: STATUS OF AGENCY COMPLIANCE 1 (Apr. 1994) [hereinafter GAO 
REPORT]. 
3 Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-354, § 2(a)(2), 94 Stat. 1164, 1164 (1980). 
4 See Paul R. Verkuil, A Critical Guide to the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 1982 DUKE L.J. 213, 
221 (1982). 
5 See id. 
6 See id. 
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gress found that the net result of these negative effects is to decrease 
competition and innovation.7 
This burden on small business was particularly troublesome at the 
time of the RFA's passage because of the enormous contribution to 
the national economy that small businesses made. In 1981, small busi-
ness generated thirty-nine percent of the nation's gross national prod-
uct.S The efficacy of the RFA continues to be an important issue as 
small businesses were the major source of new jobs in the United 
States between 1988 and 1990.9 With the rise in regulations since 1990, 
however, the ability of small business to continue to create new jobs 
has declined.lO Estimates place the current cost to the United States 
economy of regulations at $600 billion and rising.l1 
Despite the importance of the RFA in protecting this crucial com-
ponent of the United States economy,12 internal weaknesses and ex-
ternal interpretations have deprived the RFA of its influence on the 
regulatory process virtually since its adoption. The result is that 
satisfaction of the RFA's requirements largely depends on the good 
faith and voluntary compliance of each executive agency.13 Compliance 
has been sporadic at best, and even the most faithful agencies can 
avoid the RFA's requirements when it is convenient for them to do 
so. In response to the detrimental effect on small businesses of regu-
lations promulgated outside of the RFA's special flexibility analysis 
requirements, small-business advocates are petitioning Congress to 
amend the RFA.14 
This Comment examines the weaknesses of the RFA and explores 
methods of strengthening the RF A to restore the statute as an aid to 
small businesses and other small entities facing burdensome govern-
mental regulations.15 Section II explores aspects of the RFA that have 
7 Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-354, § 2(a)(2), 94 Stat. 1164, 1164 (1980). 
8 Verkuil, supra note 4, at 219. 
9 The Regulatory Flexibility Act: Hearing before the Committee on Small Business, House 
of Representatives, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (July 28, 1993) [hereinafter 1993 Hearing] (testi-
mony of Mark W. Isakowitz, Legislative Representative, National Federation of Independent 
Business). 
10 See id. 
11141 CONGo REC. H2404 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Thomas W. Ewing (R-Ill.)). 
12 [d. at H2411 (statement of Rep. Zachary P. Wamp (R-Tenn.)). Small businesses employ more 
than fifty-three percent of the work force in the United States. [d. (statement of Rep. Wamp). 
l:l See Freedman, supra note 2, at 442. 
14141 CONGo REC. H2408 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R-Ill.». 
15 Although this Comment is primarily concerned with the effect of the RFA and the proposed 
reforms of the RFA on small businesses, these same effects also apply generally to other small 
entities as defined infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. 
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been problematic in implementation and evaluates the efficacy of the 
current proposals for reform of the RFA in addressing the problems 
arising in the implementation of the RFA. Section III focuses spe-
cifically on the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) rule-mak-
ing processes and record of compliance with the RFA. The EPA's 
actions taken pursuant to the RFA demonstrate the need for and 
possible results of RFA reform. 
II. THE RFA IN ACTION: WEAKER THAN INTENDED 
The RFA was intended to alter the way federal regulatory agencies 
treat small business.16 Widespread change in agency treatment of 
small business, however, has not resulted from the RFA's operationY 
Due to the failure to alter agency rulemaking affecting small busi-
nesses in a significant manner, legislators and small-business advo-
cates continue to propose amendments to the RFA that will further 
encourage changes in the agency rule-making process.IS 
A. A General Introduction to the RFA 
Congress passed the RFA in response to growing concerns among 
small-business owners that the rise in federal regulations adversely 
affected the economic health of the small-business sector.19 Although 
Congress wanted to ensure that the effect of regulations on small 
businesses was not onerous, Congress opted not to give small busi-
nesses a blanket exemption from regulations.20 Rather, the RFA was 
created to encourage an informed and practical rule-making process 
in which the regulated entities participate.21 The participation ofregu-
lated entities will lead to regulatory alternatives that permit the 
agencies to continue to regulate small businesses, but that also facili-
tate compliance by small businesses.22 In addition to requiring regu-
lated entities to participate in the rule-making process, the RFA also 
requires agencies promulgating rules affecting small businesses to 
16 See Milton D. Stewart, The New Regulatory Flexibility Act, 67 A.B.A. J. 66, 66 (Jan. 1981). 
17 See Freedman, supra note 2, at 442. 
1~ See, e.g., Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995, Division C, Regulatory Reform 
and Relief Act, H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter Reform Act]. 
19 See Stewart, supra note 16, at 66. 
20 See Verkuil, supra note 4, at 223. 
21 See Freedman, supra note 2, at 442. 
22 See id. at 441-42; Verkuil, supra note 4, at 229. 
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perform special analyses to discover and address any adverse effect 
the regulations have on small businesses.28 
Congress passed the RFA as an amendment to the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA).24 The RFA, therefore, incorporates general 
administrative law principles of internal analysis and public comment 
and review of federal rulemaking.25 Indeed, the final regulations to 
which the RFA applies can be challenged under the APA as arbitrary 
or capricious.26 Although public participation in the rule making proc-
ess increases with use of public comment procedures, the RFA makes 
the agencies ultimately responsible for analyzing their rules and pro-
viding that analysis to regulated entities.27 This agency self-analysis 
is particularly necessary because small entities are disadvantaged not 
only in their legislative sophistication, but also in their access to and 
experience with statutes and regulations.28 
In passing the RF A, Congress intended not only to decrease the 
burden of governmental regulations on small entities, but also to 
increase the communication between small businesses and agency 
rulemakers throughout the rule making process.29 Congress assumed 
that the increased communications would illuminate the difficulties 
faced by small businesses and the regulatory alternatives available to 
23 See Freedman, supra note 2, at 443. 
24 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701--06 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
25 Freedman, supra note 2, at 441. 
2.; See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (stating arbitrary and capricious standard for judicial review of 
agency actions under the APA); see also 126 CONGo REC. 21,457 (1980) (statement of Sen. John 
C. Culver (D-Iowa» (explaining that the APA's standards for challenging agency actions also 
apply under the RFA). 
27 See Freedman, supra note 2, at 441. 
28 See id. (explaining that agencies have more knowledge and expertise with regulations than 
do regulated entities); see also 141 CONGo REC. H2416 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. 
Tom DeLay (R-Tex.» (explaining that small businesses need at least one year to learn about 
and assess the impact of new regulations affecting their businesses). 
29 See Verkuil, supra note 4, at 229. When passing the RFA, the Senate adopted a substitute 
bill proposed on the floor. See 126 CONGo REC. 21,449 (1980) (statement of Sen. Culver). The 
substitute bill was explained by the proponent, Senator John C. Culver, in a thorough analysis 
of each section. Id. at 21,452; see Freedman, supra note 2, at 456. As neither the House nor the 
Senate prepared a formal report explaining the RFA's language, most courts turn to this 
section-by-section analysis of the RFA when deciding cases involving the RFA. See Freedman, 
supra note 2, at 456. An important change made in the substitute bill was to include a separate 
provision barring judicial review. See Verkuil, supra note 4, at 261. Another change accom-
plished by the substitute bill was to make the RFA an amendment to the APA, rather than an 
amendment to the Small Business Act. See Freedman, supra note 2, at 456. 
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avoid those difficulties to the rulemakers at an early stage in the rule 
making process.30 
The RF A applies to all agency rulemakings that have a "significant 
impact on a substantial number of small entities."3l Despite the recur-
rence of this standard of qualification for the RF A's coverage through-
out the statute, only the term "small entities" is defined in the stat-
ute.32 Small entities include small businesses,33 small organizations,34 
and small governmental jurisdictions.35 
The RFA uses the Small Business Act definitions of what consti-
tutes a small business.36 For manufacturing industries, the defini-
tion depends on the number of employees; for service, wholesale, 
retail, and other non-manufacturing industries, the definition de-
pends on the dollar volume of annual receipts.37 Agencies that wish 
to use a different definition of "small business" may adopt such 
a definition after consulting with the Chief Counsel of Advo-
cacy of the Small Business Administration (CCA), completing the 
appropriate notice and comment procedures, and publishing the alter-
native definition in the Federal Register.38 The RFA permits the de-
velopment of an alternative definition of small business in recogni-
tion of the fact that the Small Business Administration (SBA) 
definitions were created for loan and procurement purposes and 
may not be consonant with the purposes of other regulating agen-
cies.39 Indeed, a 1992 study evaluating the compliance of various 
EPA regulations with the RFA noted that the standard SBA defini-
tion of "small business" is inapplicable to most EPA regula-
tions, and that the EPA therefore often formulates its own defini-
30 See Verkuil, supra note 4, at 229. 
31 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12. This language can be found in 5 U.S.C. §§ 602, 605(b), 609, and 610. 
Variations on this language are used in other sections of the RFA. The variations are understood 
to have the same meaning. 
32 [d. § 601. 
33 [d. § 601(6). 
34 [d. Section 601(4) defines small organization as a "not-for-profit enterprise which is inde-
pendently owned and operated and is not dominant in its field." 
35 [d. § 601(6). A governmental body can qualify if the population does not exceed fifty 
thousand and it governs "cities, counties, towns, townships, villages, school districts, or special 
districts." [d. § 601(5). 
36 See id. § 601(3). 
37 See Small Business Administration Standard Industrial Classification Codes and Size Stand-
ards, 13 C.F.R. § 121.601 (1994); Stewart, supra note 16, at 67. 
38 5 U.S.C. § 601(3). 
39 See Verkuil, supra note 4, at 232. 
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tion.40 In addition to the SBA standards, agencies generally consider 
two other factors in determining whether a business is "small."41 
Specifically, agencies consider whether a business is "independently 
owned and operated" and whether a business is "not dominant in its 
field."42 
The RFA requires agencies to analyze their rules for significant 
impacts on small entities.43 If such an impact exists, the agencies must 
explore alternative proposals that would achieve the regulatory pur-
poses while also lessening the regulatory burden on the affected 
entities.44 When an agency gives notice of a proposed rulemaking in 
the Federal Register pursuant to § 553 of the APA,45 the RFA also 
requires the agency to publish an Initial Regulatory Flexibility 
Analysis (IRF A) in the Federal Register summarizing the impact the 
proposed rule will have on small entities and describing any sig-
nificant alternatives to the rule.46 An agency issuing a final rule must 
also prepare a Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) and 
either publish the FRFA in the Federal Register with the final rule 
or make the FRF A available to the public upon requestY In addition 
40 See MICROECONOMIC ApPLICATIONS, INC., COST-EFFECTIVE REGULATION BY EPA AND 
SMALL BUSINESS IMPACTS 60-61 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 STUDY]. 
41 See Verkuil, supra note 4, at 233. 
42 See id. For further explanation of the term "not dominant in field of operation," see 13 C.F.R. 
§ 121.406. 
4a See Freedman, supra note 2, at 441. 
44 See id.; GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 1. 
45 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
46Id. § 603. Section 603(b) requires the IRFA to contain: 
(1) a description of the reasons why action by the agency is being considered; (2) a 
succinct statement of the objectives of, and legal basis for, the proposed rule; (3) a 
description of and where feasible, an estimate of the number of small entities to which 
the proposed rule will apply; (4) a description of the projected ... compliance require-
ments ... [and] an estimate of the classes of small entities which will be subject to the 
requirement ... ; (5) an identification, to the extent practicable, of all relevant Federal 
rules which may duplicate ... the proposed rule. 
Section 603(c) explains the requirement for discussion of significant alternatives, including ones 
that provide: 
(1) the establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or timetables 
that take into account the resources available to small entities; (2) the clarification, 
consolidation, or simplification of compliance and reporting requirements ... ; (3) the 
use of performance rather than design standards; and (4) an exemption from coverage 
of the rule, or any part thereof, for such small entities. 
47Id. § 604. The FRFA must contain: 
(1) a succinct statement of the need for, and the objectives of, the rule; (2) a summary 
of the issues raised by the public comments in response to the [IRFA], a summary of 
the assessment of the agency of such issues, and a statement of any changes made in 
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to publication of these documents, § 609 of the RF A requires agencies 
promulgating rules to provide adequate notice to the affected small 
entities, thereby facilitating meaningful participation in the rule-mak-
ing process.48 
Although the RFA specifically requires agencies to consider the 
impact of a rule on small businesses both when the rule is proposed 
and when the rule is finalized, not all rules are in fact subjected to 
flexibility analysis.49 Commentators recognize four main problem ar-
eas in the implementation of the RFA.50 First, the RFA precludes 
judicial review of any agency action taken pursuant to its provisions.51 
Second, agencies may avoid the IRFA, the FRFA, and the § 609 public 
comment gathering procedures pursuant to the RFA's certification 
provision.52 Courts interpreting the RFA only require agencies to 
analyze regulations that directly affect small businesses.5:3 Finally, the 
RFA makes the CCA responsible for monitoring agency compliance 
with the RFA, but the CCA's exercise of this power has been greatly 
hindered.54 In reaction to these problem areas, Congress is seeking to 
the proposed rule as a result of such comments; and (3) a description of each of the 
significant alternatives to the rule consistent with the stated objectives of applicable 
statutes and designed to minimize any significant economic impact of the rule on small 
entities which was considered by the agency, and a statement of the reasons why each 
one of such alternatives was rejected. 
4H See id. § 609. This provision states: 
[wlhen any rule is promulgated which will have a significant economic impact on a 
substantial number of small entities, the head of the agency promulgating the rule ... 
shall assure that small entities have been given an opportunity to participate in the 
rulemaking for the rule through techniques such as (1) the inclusion in an advanced 
notice of proposed rulemaking, if issued, of a statement that the proposed rule may 
have a significant economic effect on a substantial number of small entities; (2) the 
publication of general notice of proposed rulemaking in publications likely to be ob-
tained by small entities; (3) the direct notification of interested small entities; (4) the 
conduct of open conferences or public hearings concerning the rule for small entities; 
and (5) the adoption or modification of agency procedural rules to reduce the cost or 
complexity of participation in the rulemaking by small entities. 
49 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 10 (testimony of Doris S. Freedman, acting Chief Counsel 
for Advocacy, Small Business Administration). 
50 See, e.g., id. at 10-11 (testimony of Doris S. Freedman). 
51 5 U.S.C. § 611; see 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 111, 112 n.6 (statement of Doris S. 
Freedman). The judicial review provisions are discussed in greater detail infra Part ILB.1. 
52 5 U.S.C. § 605(b); see 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 114 (statement of Doris S. Freedman). 
The certification provision is discussed in greater detail infra Part II.B.2. 
i>l See Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 773 F.2d 327, 342 
(D.C. Cir. 1985). The consideration of indirect effects is discussed in greater detail infra Part 
II.B.3. 
54 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 6-7 (testimony of Rep. Thomas W. Ewing (R-Ill.». The 
role of the CCA is discussed in greater detail infra Part ILB.4. 
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amend the RFA to provide for limited judicial review of agency ac-
tions under the RFA and to reinforce the role of the CCA.55 
B. The Limitations in the RF A 
The RF A's effect on agency rulemaking has not been as great 
as was anticipated upon the RFA's passage.56 The RFA's inadequa-
cies largely result from the inability of small businesses to challenge 
agency actions and certifications that do not comply with the RFA's 
requirements.57 Agencies may adopt regulations that harm small busi-
nesses while bypassing the RFA's requirements because the effect is 
not direct enough to merit regulatory flexibility analysis.58 Finally, the 
CCA-the only entity having any statutory oversight of agencies' 
compliance with the RFA-has insufficient power to influence agency 
rulemaking.59 
1. Lack of Judicial Review Provisions 
The APA, which governs administrative actions generally, allows 
for judicial review of agency actions unless another statute specifically 
precludes such review.60 The RFA specifically precludes judicial 
review.6! The lack of judicial review under the RFA has left small 
businesses with no avenue to challenge agency actions that fail to give 
proper consideration to the impact of the actions on small businesses.62 
Small-business advocates have cited the lack of judicial review as 
the main problem with the RFA, because the lack of review deprives 
the RFA of any influence over agency actions.63 Much of the litigation 
and confusion surrounding the implementation of the RFA arises from 
the ambiguous language used in the RFA's judicial review provision.64 
Section 611 of the RFA provides: 
(b) Any regulatory flexibility analysis prepared under sections 
603 [IRFA] and 604 [FRFA] of this title and the compliance or 
55 See Reform Act, supra note 18, §§ 301-13. 
56 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 10 (testimony of Doris S. Freedman). 
57 See Freedman, supra note 2, at 463. 
58 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 11 (testimony of Doris S. Freedman). 
59 See Freedman, supra note 2, at 450; infra notes 158-63 and accompanying text. 
60 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). 
61 [d. § 611; see 141 CONGo REC. H2411 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Rob Portman 
(R-Ohio» (noting that it is a rare exception to prohibit judicial review of a statute). 
62 See Freedman, supra note 2, at 463-64. 
63 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 5 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
64 See Verkuil, supra note 4, at 263. 
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noncompliance of the agency with the provisions of this chapter 
shall not be subject to judicial review. When an action for judicial 
review of a rule is instituted, any regulatory flexibility analysis 
for such rule shall constitute part of the whole record of agency 
action in connection with the review.65 
211 
In passing the RFA, Congress was concerned about the amount of 
litigation the RF A might generate and therefore sought to constrain 
judicial review under the RFA.66 The legislative history explains that 
Congress, in writing the judicial review provision, wanted to 
strike[] a balance between two central aims with regard to the 
role of the courts. The first is to insure that an agency's compliance 
with the objectives of this bill be subject to meaningful, yet re-
sponsibly defined, judicial oversight .... On the other hand, the 
bill avoids the substantial disruption of agency rulemaking inher-
ent in allowing separate judicial review of the regulatory flexibil-
ity analysis itself .... 67 
Thus, although Congress did not want to bar courts from reviewing 
all agency actions under the RFA, it created § 611(b) to constrain 
consideration of the FRF A only as one part of the final rule's admin-
istrative record.68 
Other statements made during the congressional debate, however, 
suggest that Congress desired a broader availability of judicial re-
view. During the debate on the passage of the House of Repre-
sentatives version of the RFA, Representative Joseph M. McDade 
stated that if an agency erroneously certified its rule as having no 
impact on small entities,69 the House Committee on Small Business 
intended "that the court should strike down the regulation."70 Simi-
larly, Senator John C. Culver stated that an inadequate or non-exis-
65 5 U.S.C. § 611(b). The other provisions of § 611 are as follows: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), any detennination by an agency 
concerning the applicability of any of the provisions of this chapter to any action of the 
agency shall not be subject to judicial review .... (c) Nothing in this section bars 
judicial review of any other impact statement or similar analysis required by any other 
law if judicial review of such statement or analysis is otherwise provided by law. 
66 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 112 (statement of Doris S. Freedman); Stewart, supra, 
note 16, at 67. 
67 126 CONGo REC. 21,457 (1980) (statement of Sen. Culver). 
68 See Verkuil, supra note 4, at 262. As discussed supra note 29, the section-by-section analysis 
presented before the Senate is the main piece of legislative history relating to the RF.Ns 
passage, and is generally thought to incorporate the views of both the House and the Senate. 
See Freedman, supra note 2, at 456. 
69 The RF.Ns certification procedures are discussed in more detail infra Part ILB.2. 
70 126 CONGo REC. 24,583 (1980) (statement of Rep. Joseph M. McDade (R-Pa.)). 
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tent FRF A could be a sufficient basis on which to strike down a rule.71 
These statements are contrary to the balance intended by Congress, 
which limited the judicial review of a flexibility analysis to part of the 
overall rule-making record in order to prevent undue disruption of 
the rule-making process.72 
Despite Congress's clear concern that responsible judicial oversight 
of an agency's regulatory flexibility analysis should be allowed with-
out retarding efficient rulemaking, Congress's pronouncements in 
§ 611(b) have proved ambiguous in practice. The legislative history 
states that Congress designed § 611(b) to provide some judicial over-
sight without subjecting the regulatory flexibility analysis itself to 
"separate judicial review."73 This phrase, however, could be inter-
preted as forbidding only interlocutory review or as completely for-
bidding review of the regulatory flexibility analyses when determin-
ing the reasonableness of the rule.74 Most courts have held that the 
analysis itself cannot be separately reviewed.75 Illustrative of this 
accepted interpretation is Thompson v. Clark,76 where challengers of 
a Department of the Interior rule increasing fees for certain oil and 
gas leases claimed that § 611(b) only sought to preclude interlocutory 
review of regulatory flexibility analyses.77 The challengers asserted, 
however, that courts were permitted to determine the sufficiency of 
an agency's analyses as part of the review of the final rule.78 The 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
disagreed.79 The court held that § 611(b) permits a court to review the 
FRFA in determining the reasonableness of the rule under other 
71 See 126 CONGo REC. 21,457 (1980) (statement of Sen. Culver) (explaining that an agency's 
failure to perform the regulatory flexibility analysis in good faith would leave the agency unable 
to provide substantive grounds in support of its final rule, and that a court could then invalidate 
the rule). 
72 See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. One commentator has noted that attributing 
the weight to the FRFA which the legislators' statements suggest is inconsistent with the idea 
expressed in the second sentence of § 611(b), that the FRFA is simply part of the entire 
rule-making record. See Verkuil, supra note 4, at 263. 
73 126 CONGo REC. 21,457 (1980) (statement of Sen. Culver); see also supra notes 66-68 and 
accompanying text. 
74 Verkuil, supra note 4, at 262. 
75 See, e.g., Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Small Refiner Lead Phase-
Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
76 See Thompson, 741 F.2d at 405. 
77 See id. 
78 [d. 
79 [d. 
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applicable laws, but not in determining whether the agency complied 
with the RFA.80 
Even accepting that Congress intended to implement the weaker 
of the two interpretations-that the FRF A is simply another part of 
the entire record and should not be reviewed on its own merit-courts 
have proven reluctant to assess adequately the FRFA's adequacy or 
absence when reviewing the reasonableness of a rulemaking.81 Al-
though most courts state that an inadequate FRFA may be the basis 
for striking down a rule, no court has ever struck down a rule on this 
rationale.82 The court in Thompson provided the only guidance about 
when an agency's mistake in its regulatory flexibility analysis can 
justify overturning a rule.83 A court can overturn the rule only if the 
agency's analysis is so defective that the rule is unreasonable84 or if 
the agency fails to respond to public comments on the rulemaking.85 
Furthermore, in Michigan v. Thomas, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld an EPA action disapproving 
Michigan's fugitive dust emissions rules and imposing a construction 
moratorium until emissions were further reduced or Michigan fash-
ioned satisfactory rules.86 The court upheld the action even though the 
EPA failed to certify the action as having no economic impact on small 
entities, to perform an initial regulatory flexibility analysis, or to 
consider significant alternatives to the construction ban.87 Although 
the EPA completely failed to abide by the requirements ofthe RFA, 
the court determined that the EPA had addressed the regulatory 
HO Id. (citing Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 539 (D.C. Cir. 
1983». 
Rl See, e.g., Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 188 (6th Cir. 1986) (approving EPA's actions 
even absent either a certification or a flexibility analysis). 
82 See Thompson, 741 F.2d at 405; Small Refiner, 705 F.2d at 539. But see National Truck 
Equip. Ass'n V. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 919 F.2d 1148, 1157 (6th Cir. 1990), 
reh'g denied, 928 F.2d 739 (6th Cir.) (en banc), where the court noted that the Administration's 
statement that regulatory action would not affect small business was "a conclusory statement 
with no evidentiary support in the record," and was not sufficient to prove the Administration 
had complied with the Regulatory Flexibility Act. Id. Although the National Truck court 
actually struck down the Administration's rule under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the 
court noted the Administration's noncompliance with the RFA as another piece of evidence to 
support its conclusion of unreasonableness. See id. 
83 See Thompson, 741 F.2d at 405. 
84 See id. at 408. The court explained that the agency's analysis is defective when it "under-
estimate[s] the harm inflicted upon small business to such a degree that, when adjustment is 
made for the error, that harm clearly outweighs the claimed benefits of the rule." See id. at 405. 
85 See id. at 408. 
86 Michigan V. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 188 (6th Cir. 1986). 
87 See id. at 187. 
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flexibility analysis requirements sufficiently on the basis of the entire 
rule-making record.88 The court in Michigan v. Thomas looked to the 
Thompson court's explanation of when a rule may be overturned and 
held that because the moratorium was required by law, the EPA was 
not required to subject its rule to public comment and had not acted 
unreasonably in imposing the moratorium.89 
The lack of judicial review also has impeded the CCA in fulfilling 
its role in the implementation of the RFA.90 Section 612 of the RFA 
charges the CCA with monitoring and reporting on the status of 
agency compliance with the RFA, and grants the CCA special inter-
vention powers to advocate for small businesses.91 Without any en-
forcement mechanism in the RFA, the CCA must rely on its powers 
of persuasion to convince agencies to alter their policies and rules 
affecting small businesses.92 
In practice, courts have construed the judicial review provision 
strictly and have refused to scrutinize any agency action directly 
pursuant to the RF A. 93 Commentators have reflected that the result 
of this lack of judicial oversight is that agencies view compliance with 
the RF A as optional because the RF A is, in effect, an "unenforceable 
88 See id. at 188. The EPA argued that the EPA had already considered small business impacts 
in its overall action and had, therefore complied with § 605(a) of the RFA which states that the 
analyses required by the RFA can be performed "in conjunction with or as part of any other 
... analysis ... if such other analysis satisfies the provisions" of the RFA. 5 U .S.C. § 605(a); see 
Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d at 187. The court concluded that the EPA had satisfied the 
requirements of the RFA, but the court did not base that conclusion on § 605(a) of the RFA. 
See Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d at 188. Rather, the court stated that the Clean Air Act 
required the imposition of the moratorium and there were, therefore, no available alternatives 
for small entities. See id. at 179, 188. 
89 See Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d at 188. The decision not only adversely affected small 
businesses that had to halt their construction activities, but also sets a disturbing precedent for 
the small business community as an example of a court allowing agency action without any real 
evidence of agency compliance with the RFA. 
90 5 U.S.C. § 612; see 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 6-7 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). The 
importance of the CCA in the implementation of the RFA is discussed in greater detail infra 
Part II.B.4. 
91 5 U.S.C. § 612. 
92 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 29 (testimony of Doris S. Freedman). 
93 See Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d at 188; Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 405 (D.C. Cir. 
1984); Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
Even though an agency's regulatory flexibility analysis is not subject to direct review, these 
courts hold that the analysis should become part of the overall rule-making record and should 
be evidence of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the rule itself. But see Sargent v. 
Block, 576 F. Supp. 882, 893 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding that the court will review the compliance of 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture with the RFA independent of the reasonableness of the 
rule). However, Sargent has been discounted in subsequent Circuit Court decisions. See, e.g., 
---------- ----------------
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administrative procedure."94 Given this lax attitude, even the most 
diligent agency can, on occasion, avail itself of the RFA's permissive-
ness.95 In practice, agencies have taken advantage of the lack of judi-
cial review to fashion rules without consideration of the impact on 
small business.96 Legislators have responded to this failure to comply 
with the RF A's requirements by proposing amendments to 
strengthen and clarify the RF A's judicial review provision.97 
2. Certification 
Despite the existence of the RFA's flexibility analyses require-
ments, the RFA also gives agencies a way to circumvent those re-
quirements.98 An agency, by certifying that no significant impacts will 
result to small entities because of the agency action, removes the 
agency action from the reach of the RFA.99 Certification, together 
with the absence of judicial review,loo further impairs the ability of 
small businesses to challenge agency actions. lOl The ability of agencies 
to remove their rulemakings from the analysis requirements of the 
RFA and from the useful involvement of the small-business commu-
nity is a pressing problem, especially when such a decision is not 
subject to judicial oversight by COurtS.102 In 1987, the CCA received 
112 IRFAs for proposed rulemakings and 1043 certifications by 
agency heads that the RF A did not apply to proposed rules. loa In 
addition to agencies certifying rules in the majority of cases, agencies 
also often use boiler-plate language in their certifications, which indi-
cates the unwillingness of agencies to particularize the certification 
decision as required by the RF A.l04 
Section 605(b) of the RF A exempts an agency from the flexibility 
analyses requirements if the head of the agency certifies that the 
proposed rule will not have "a significant economic impact on a sub-
Lehigh Valley Farmers v. Block, 640 F. Supp. 1497, 1518--19 (E.D. Pa. 1986), a/i'd, 829 F.2d 409 
(3d Cir. 1987). 
94 Freedman, supra note 2, at 463. 
95 See id. 
96 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 10 (testimony of Doris S. Freedman). 
97 See infra Part lI.C.1. 
98 See 5 U.S.C. § 605(b). 
99Id. 
100 See supra Part lI.B.1. 
101 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 114 (statement of Doris S. Freedman). 
102 See id. at 114--15 (statement of Doris S. Freedman). 
103 Freedman, supra note 2, at 446 n.23. 
104 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 1Hi (testimony of Rep. Ewing). Section 605(b) of the 
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stantial number of small entities."!05 The agency must also explain the 
reasons for the decision in a "succinct statement."l06 Once the agency 
has certified its rule, the agency is free to promulgate the rule without 
performing the specialized flexibility analyses and without specifically 
notifying small entities of the purpose or content of the rule.107 
In addition to publishing this certification in the Federal Register, 
the agency head is required to provide a copy to the CCA.lo8 Although 
the CCA can provide comments to the agency about the validity of 
the certification, the CCA has no power to overturn the agency head's 
categorization of the rule or to force the agency to heed the CCA's 
recommendations.109 
The majority of courts do not subject agency certification to judicial 
review. l1° The refusal of courts to review the adequacy of an agency's 
certification conflicts with Representative Joseph M. McDade's state-
ment in the House debate on the RFA that the Small Business Com-
mittee intended that a rule should be struck down if the agency 
wrongly determined that the rule had no significant economic impact 
on a substantial number of small entities.1l1 The Thompson court, 
RFA requires the agency head, when publishing the certification statement also to publish a 
"succinct statement explaining the reasons for such certification." 5 U.S.C. § 605(b). 
105 5 U.S.C. § 605(b). 
106 [d. 
107 See id. The decision to certify would essentially free the agency of the requirements of 
§ 609 of the RFA, discussed supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
108 [d. 
109 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 201 (statement of Leo McDonough, President, TEC/Penn-
sylvania Small Business United). 
110 Courts rely on the language in § 611(a) of the RFA stating that "any determination by an 
agency concerning the applicability of any of the provisions of this chapter to any action of the 
agency shall not be subject to judicial review," and § 611(b) of the RFA stating that "the 
compliance or noncompliance of the agency with the provisions of this chapter shall not be 
subject to judicial review." See American Mining Congress v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 771-72 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (holding that the EPA's decision to certify "constitutes a 'determination by an agency 
concerning the applicability of any of the provisions of' the RFA, and is therefore unreviewable" 
even though the EPA failed to truly understand the impact of its rule); Colorado ex rel. Colorado 
State Banking Bd. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 926 F.2d 931, 948 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that an 
agency's certification is not subject to judicial review); Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 405 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that the certification decision "cannot possibly be understood as 
anything other than" a determination of the RFA's applicability); Lehigh Valley Farmers v. 
Block, 640 F. Supp. 1497, 1518, 1520 (E.D. Pa. 1986), aff'd, 829 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting 
that agency's certification was incorrect, but was nevertheless not subject to judicial review). 
But see Sargent v. Block, 576 F. Supp. 882, 893 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding that court can review 
agency's decision to certify). 
111 See 126 CONGo REC. 24,583 (1980) (statement of Rep. McDade). 
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however, discounted Representative McDade's statement as an unre-
liable characterization.1l2 
The legislative history regarding judicial review of certification 
decisions also raises the same ambiguities as the judicial review pro-
vision regarding the role of the flexibility analyses themselves. The 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
in Lehigh Valley Farmers v. Block, noted that the testimony of Sena-
tor John C. Culver, upon whose statements most courts have relied 
in interpreting the RF A, was in some respects contradictory.1l3 In 
addition to stating that the agency has "sole discretion"114 in deter-
mining whether to conduct a regulatory flexibility analysis, the Sena-
tor also stated that an agency's disregard of the RF A's analysis re-
quirements would be "grounds to argue that this fact is evidence of 
the unreasonableness of the rule."115 Nonetheless, the court deter-
mined that Senator Culver's first statement of sole agency discretion 
controlled, without giving any rationale for why the court weighed 
the statements as it did.1l6 
Despite the harmful consequences of a misinformed or inadequately 
justified certification, most courts strictly construed the judicial re-
view provisions of the RFA as precluding judicial review of certifica-
tion decisions.ll7 The court in Lehigh Valley noted that the Depart-
ment of Agriculture's certification of a rule amending milk marketing 
orders was incorrect because the rule would in fact have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities as defined 
in the RFA.ns Nevertheless, the court declined to address the effect 
of the inaccurate certification upon the validity of the final rule be-
cause § 611(a) precludes judicial review of the agency's certification.1l9 
Relying on previous District of Columbia Circuit court opinions and 
112 Thompson, 741 F.2d at 407. The court noted that Representative Joseph M. McDade served 
on the Small Business Committee which had favored a version of the RFA that did not contain 
a prohibition of judicial review. [d. The court concluded that because he favored allowing judicial 
review, his "characterization of the effect of the legislation is not reliable." [d. 
113 Lehigh Valley, 640 F. Supp. at 1520 n.20. 
114 126 CONGo REC. 21,460--61 (1980) (statement of Sen. Culver). 
115 [d. at 21,457 (statement of Sen. Culver). 
116 See Lehigh Valley, 640 F. Supp. at 1520 n.20. 
117 See, e.g., American Mining Congress v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 771 (9th Cir. 1992); Colorado ex 
reI. Colorado State Banking Bd. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 926 F.2d 931, 948 (lOth Cir. 1991). 
118 See Lehigh Valley, 640 F. Supp. at 1518. 
119 See id. at 1519--20; see also American Mining Congress, 965 F.2d at 771 (holding that court 
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the statements of Senator Culver, the court noted that the decision 
to certify "remains in the sole discretion of the agency."120 
One court, disagreeing with the majority of courts on the issue of 
judicial review of certifications, reviewed the adequacy of an agency's 
certification and held that although the certification could have been 
better documented, the decision was supported by the overall record 
and should therefore stand.121 However, later courts discredited this 
decision because the court had already determined that the plaintiffs 
lacked standing to sue and therefore did not need to examine the 
adequacy of the agency's certification decision.122 
The ability of agencies to ignore or to perform inadequate flexibility 
analyses without fear of judicial review limits the efficacy of the 
RF A.123 This harm is exacerbated by the concurrent ability of agencies 
to remove the rulemaking from the RFA requirements through cer-
tification.124 Similarly, many agencies give inadequate explanations of 
the reasons behind the certification, disregarding § 605(b )'s "succinct 
statement" requirement.125 Therefore, proponents of regulatory re-
form also suggest a change in the RFA's certification procedures.126 
3. Consideration of Indirect Effects 
In addition to the lack of judicial oversight of agency actions re-
quired by the RFA, some regulations escape flexibility analysis be-
cause the effect of the regulations is not direct enough to merit 
separate small-business impact analysis.127 This loophole occurs partly 
because both the RFA and the legislative history are ambiguous as 
to the extent of the RFA's substantive coverage.128 The RFA applies 
to agency rulemaking when there is a "significant economic impact on 
lacked authority to strike down the EPA's storm water rule solely because the certification was 
flawed). See also supra note 110 (discussing flawed certification decisions). 
120 Lehigh Valley, 640 F. Supp. at 1519 (citing Thompson v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 406 (D.C. Cir. 
1984), and quoting remarks of Senator Culver, 126 CONGo REC. 21,460-61 (1980». 
121 See Sargent v. Block, 576 F. Supp. 882, 893 (D.D.C. 1983). The United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia is the only court ever to have separately reviewed an agency's 
action based on the RFA. No decision after Sargent has cited the case with approval. 
122 See Lehigh Valley, 640 F. Supp. at 1518-19. 
123 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 114 (statement of Doris S. Freedman). 
124 See id. (statement of Doris S. Freedman). 
125 See id. at 5 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
126 See id. at 5--6 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
127 See id. at 11 (testimony of Doris S. Freedman). 
128 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 11 (testimony of Doris S. Freedman). 
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a substantial number of small entities."l29 Unfortunately, the RFA 
does not define either "significant economic impact" or "substantial 
number."13o Another insufficiently defined term is "impact." Here, the 
question concerns whether indirect effects are within the statute's 
purview. In other words, the issue is whether an impact exists when 
an agency directly regulates a large entity, but the true effect of the 
regulation is passed on to a small entity.131 
Despite Senator Culver's statement that agencies should analyze 
both direct and indirect effects,132 courts have precluded the consid-
eration of indirect effects from the agencies' responsibilities in com-
plying with the RFA.l33 Illustrative is Mid-Tex Electric Cooperative 
v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), where utilities 
customers challenged FERC's rule changing the manner of rate cal-
culation.l34 The challengers argued that the language used in the RF A 
was broader than the defendant contended,135 and that the appearance 
of the CCA before FERC to encourage the agency to interpret the 
129 5 U.S.C. § 602 (requiring every agency to publish a biannual agenda indicating rules the 
agency expects to propose that will have a "significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities"); [d. § 605(b) (exempting agencies from IRFA and FRFA requirements if rule 
in question will not have a "significant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities"); [d. § 609 (requiring agencies to assure affected entities are given an opportunity to 
participate when the rule will have a "significant economic impact on a substantial number of 
small entities"); [d. § 610 (requiring periodic review of rules that will have a "significant eco-
nomic impact on a substantial number of small entities" to determine the continuing necessity 
or reasonableness of such rules). 
130 See id. § 601. Although "substantial number" is not defined, it has not become a source of 
litigation. It may be that once an agency recognizes the existence of an adverse effect on some 
of the regulated small entities, the agency may be reluctant to expend resources on more 
accurately determining the number or percentage of entities affected by the rule. Similarly, an 
agency arguing that its certification is valid because an insubstantial number of entities have 
been affected may be more likely to suffer a challenge of arbitrariness and capriciousness. 
Therefore, it may be that agencies themselves have precluded this avenue of challenge through 
their own defensive techniques. 
131 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 11 (testimony of Doris S. Freedman). The small entity 
is indirectly affected because the small entity incurs added costs from doing business with, or 
being dependent upon, regulated entities. See id. 
132 126 CONGo REC. 21,456 (1980) (statement of Sen. Culver). Senator John C. Culver stated 
that agencies assessing whether the RFA applies to their rules under the "significant economic 
impact" standard should consider several factors, including "the direct and indirect effects of 
the proposed regulation." [d. 
133 See Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. V. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 773 F.2d 327, 342 
(D.C. Cir. 1985). 
134 [d. at 330. 
135 See id. at 342. The language relied on by the challengers comes from the requirement that 
the agency publish notification of any planned actions during the coming calendar year on "any 
rule which the agency expects to propose." [d. (citing 5 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)). The challengers' 
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RFA more broadly indicated that the RFA covers indirect effects.136 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit surveyed the legislative findings and purposes of the RFA.137 
The court noted that Congress used language such as "applied uni-
formly to small businesses," "imposed unnecessary ... demands ... 
upon small businesses," and "differences in the scale and resources of 
regulated entities."138 According to the court, this language indicated 
that the RFA only applied when the agency was regulating directly 
a small entity.139 The court thus concluded that Congress did not 
intend the potentially broad effect of having agencies consider all 
indirect effects.14o 
Notwithstanding the court's conclusion in Mid-Tex Electric, some 
indirect effects impact small businesses so obviously as to merit sepa-
rate regulatory flexibility analysis under the RFA.l4l For example, 
when an agency directly regulates an entity whose main customers 
are all small businesses, significant indirect effects occur.142 In a 1993 
hearing before the House Committee on Small Business, Repre-
sentative Thomas W. Ewing presented the case of EPA regulations 
regarding the emissions produced by off-road farm equipment.143 The 
EPA did not prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis because no small 
businesses manufactured the equipment.144 In reality, however, the 
true impact would fall on the farmers who purchase the equipment 
when the manufacturers pass on the added regulatory costS.145 In the 
words of Representative Pat Roberts, a member of the House Com-
mittee on Agriculture, "[a]s a result of the regulations, farmers could 
be paying up to $3,000 more per engine or piece of equipment."146 This 
example demonstrates that some effects, although technically indirect 
in application, are very direct in impact, and could therefore trigger 
a regulatory flexibility analysis.147 
claim was that this language intended that the RFA applied broadly to all rules affecting small 
entities, whether the effect was direct or not. See id. 
1:16 See id. 
137 See id. at 341-42. 
13~ Mid-Tex Electric, 773 F.2d at 341 (emphasis in original). 
139 See id. at 341-42. 
140 [d. at 343. 
141 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 11 (testimony of Doris S. Freedman). 
142 See id. at 7 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
143 [d. (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
144 [d. (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
145 [d. (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
146 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 96 (statement of Rep. Pat Roberts (R-Kan.». 
147 See id. at 7 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
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Although the RF A does not provide explicitly for the consideration 
of indirect effects, some statements in the legislative history indicate 
that some members of Congress anticipated that agencies would con-
sider both direct and indirect effects when preparing the regulatory 
flexibility analyses.l48 Despite judicial interpretation of the RFA as 
precluding consideration of indirect effects, recent proponents for 
reform of the RF A have provided examples of easily recognizable 
indirect effects which agencies could consider.149 
4. Decreased Role of the Office of Advocacy 
When the RFA was passed in 1980, Congress designated the Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA (CCA) as the entity that should 
monitor agency compliance with the RFA, because the CCA is the 
governmental entity best able to assess the needs of small businesses 
and small entities.l50 Commentators have noted that, to the extent 
that the CCA has been permitted, the CCA has provided much of the 
success achieved in regulatory flexibility.15l Indeed, absent judicial 
review, the CCA is the only enforcement and compliance mechanism 
of the RFA.152 
In addition to the monitoring duties conferred by § 612(a), §§ 612(b) 
and (c) of the RFA grant remarkable intervention powers to the 
CCA.153 Congress designed these provisions to ensure effective imple-
mentation of the RF A by authorizing the CCA to assist small busi-
nesses in litigation and to notify courts when a rulemaking involves 
disputes critical to small business.154 Sections 612 (b) and (c) provide: 
(b) The [CCA] is authorized to appear as amicus curiae in any 
action brought in a court of the United States to review a rule. In 
148 See 126 CONGo REc. 21,456 (1980) (statement of Sen. Culver). 
149 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 7 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
150 See Freedman, supra note 2, at 448-49 & n.37. Section 612(a) of the RFA provides that: 
[t]he [CCA] shall monitor agency compliance with this chapter and shall report at least 
annually thereon to the President and to the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate 
and House of Representatives, the Select Committee on Small Business of the Senate, 
and the Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives. 
5 U.S.C. § 612(a). 
151 See Freedman, supra note 2, at 448. 
162 See Verkuil, supra note 4, at 265. 
153 See 5 U.S.C. § 612. 
154 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 14 (testimony of James Morrison, Director of Government 
Relations, National Association of the Self-Employed, and representing the Regulatory Flexi-
bility Act Coalition). 
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any such action, the [CCA] is authorized to present his views with 
respect to the effect of the rule on small entities. 
(c) A court of the United States shall grant the application of the 
[CCA] to appear in any such action for the purposes described in 
subsection (b).155 
The intended effect of these provisions is to ensure that the CCA is 
able to independently exercise compliance, review, and amicus powers 
when monitoring agency compliance with the RFA.156 Although these 
provisions do not exist in any other statute, Congress, by granting 
these powers, emphasized the importance of the CCA's role in imple-
menting the RFA.I57 
In practice, however, the CCA has been prohibited from exercising 
the amicus privilege Congress gave it.I58 In Lehigh Valley Farmers v. 
Block, the CCA attempted to intervene as amicus curiae, but the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) argued that intervention by the CCA 
was unconstitutional.I59 The DOJ claimed that Congress lacked the 
constitutional authority to grant CCA an absolute right of interven-
tion.160 Furthermore, the DOJ contended that only independent agen-
cies may exercise amicus powers, and that even independent agencies 
are barred if an Executive branch entity or the Attorney General has 
taken a stance contrary to the position of the CCA.161 The SBA, as the 
agency under which the CCA operates, argued that its amicus power 
was limited and posed no threat to the Executive branch's viability 
as long as the Executive branch could remove the CCA.162 The dispute 
was never fully resolved because the CCA withdrew its amicus posi-
155 5 U.S.C. §§ 612(bHc). 
156 See Stewart, supra note 16, at 67. 
157 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 14 (testimony of James Morrison). These provisions are 
considered rather innovative, especially because the RFA is the only statutory scheme which 
has the provisions. Id. (testimony of James Morrison). The fact that no other federal agency has 
received amicus or intervention powers when being charged with overseeing a regulatory 
scheme may contribute to courts' reluctance to allow the CCA to exercise the rights contained 
in §§ 612(b)-(c). 
15ll See Freedman, supra note 2, at 450 n.41. 
159 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 56 (section-by-section analysis of the Regulatory Flexibility 
Amendments Act of 1993). 
160 Freedman, supra note 2, at 450 n.41. 
161 Id. The DOJ relied on § 1-402 of Executive Order 12,146 which requires that legal disputes 
between two administrative agencies should be resolved by the Attorney General. 1993 Hear-
ing, supra note 9, at 56 (section-by-section analysis of the Regulatory Flexibility Amendments 
Act of 1993). 
162 Freedman, supra note 2, at 450-51 n.41. 
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tion prior to litigating the issue with the DOJ, and the CCA has not 
asserted its amicus powers in any other case.163 
Although the RFA specifically names the CCA as the entity pri-
marily charged with the RFA's implementation, the CCA has been 
unable to fulfill this mission.164 This failure is partly due to the CCA's 
failure to assert itself, and partly due to the actions of the DOJ in 
opposing the CCA's assertion of its amicus power.165 
C. The Proposed Amendments to the RFA: Legislative Response 
to the Limitations of the RFA 
The strongest avenue of reform of the RFA currently available is 
a bill introduced in the 104th Congress on January 4, 1995, officially 
entitled the "Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995."166 
Division C of Title I of that Act, entitled "Regulatory Reform and 
Relief Act" proposes several amendments to the RFA to improve 
agency adherence to the original goals of the RFA.167 Most notably, 
the bill would permit judicial review of flexibility analyses and cer-
tifications on a limited scale, and would strengthen the CCA's role 
somewhat.168 The Reform Act, however, fails to address the indirect 
effects problem of the RFA. 
1. Judicial Review 
Current court interpretation of the judicial review provision of the 
RFA precludes small businesses from challenging agency actions sub-
163 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 56 (section-by-section analysis of the Regulatory Flexibility 
Amendments Act of 1993). 
164 See id. (section-by-section analysis of the Regulatory Flexibility Amendments Act of 1993). 
165 See id. (section-by-section analysis of the Regulatory Flexibility Amendments Act of 1993). 
166 Reform Act, supra note 18. The Reform Act passed the House on March 3, 1995, and was 
referred to the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on March 9, 1995. 141 CONGo REC. 
H2639 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1995); [d. at S3743 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 1995). In addition to the Reform 
Act, the Senate is currently considering its own bill, entitled "Comprehensive Regulatory 
Reform Act of 1995." S. 343, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(b) (1995). The Senate's bill revises only 
the judicial review section of the RFA. [d. The amendment before the Senate relating to the 
RFA's judicial review provision is substantively the same as the amendment proposed in the 
Reform Act. See id. Accordingly, references to the Reform Act's judicial review provisions also 
apply to the bill currently under consideration on the floor of the Senate. 141 CONGo REC. S7615 
(daily ed. May 26, 1995) Both the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee and the Senate 
Judiciary Committee have favorably reported the Senate bill amending the RFA. [d. at D522 
(daily ed. Apr. 27, 1995); [d. at D403 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1995). 
167 Reform Act, supra note 18, §§ 301-13. 
166 See id. §§ 311-13. 
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ject to the RFA.169 The Reform Act amends § 611 of the RFA to permit 
judicial review of an agency's certification or flexibility analysis if a 
petition for such review is filed within one year of the effective date 
of the relevant final rulepo Judicial review is only available for "af-
fected small entit[ies]," which are "small entit[ies] that [are] or will 
be adversely affected by the final rule."171 If the court finds that the 
certification decision was improper, the court may order the agency 
to prepare a FRFA.172 Similarly, if the court finds that the flexibility 
analysis was prepared improperly, the court may order the agency to 
correct the analysis.173 In either case, the agency has ninety days to 
prepare or correct the FRFA, otherwise the court may stay the rule 
or grant other appropriate relief.174 
If enacted, the provisions allowing small businesses to request ju-
dicial review likely will encourage increased agency compliance with 
RFA requirements.175 The provision, however, appears to strike a 
different balance than the one initially intended by Congress.176 Al-
though Congress discussed the need to provide for judicial oversight, 
the RFA as enacted placed more emphasis on the need for uninter-
rupted rulemaking.177 The Reform Act, in contrast, makes judicial 
oversight a priority.178 
The proposed amendment of § 611 could lead to increased litigation, 
thereby contradicting the other original concern of Congress-that of 
disruption of the rule-making process due to increased litigation.179 
Representative Thomas W. Ewing attempted to allay this concern in 
a 1993 hearing before the Committee of Small Business of the House 
of Representatives.18o In his statement, Representative Ewing noted 
169 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 5 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). The judicial review 
provisions of the RFA are discussed in more detail supra Part ILB.1. 





175 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 6 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
176 126 CONGo REG. 21,457 (1980) (statement of Sen. Culver). 
177 See id. (statement of Sen. Culver). 
17S See 141 CONGo REG. H2411 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Portman). 
179 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 6 (testimony of Rep. Ewing); see also 126 CONGo REG. 
21,457 (1980) (statement of Sen. Culver) (discussing Congress's concern about substantial dis-
ruption of agency rulemaking). 
180 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 6 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). Representative Thomas 
W. Ewing was the sponsor of H.R. 830, a bill introduced in the 103d Congress to amend the 
RFA, advocating the repeal of § 611. Although Representative Ewing's comments speak only 
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that the limited availability of remedies makes legal abuse unlikely/81 
and that small businesses will rarely bring frivolous suits because 
small businesses do not have the time or financial resources to sue 
unnecessarily.182 Therefore, the resulting disruption to the rule-mak-
ing process would be minimal.I83 In addition, although numerous suits 
might be filed upon the amendment of § 611/84 the incidence of such 
suits quickly would decrease once precedent is established.185 
Although the proposed judicial review section of the Reform Act 
strikes a different balance than the one struck by Congress when 
passing the RFA/86 the new balance encourages oversight without 
unduly disrupting the rule-making process.187 Despite the likelihood 
of some suits immediately upon the passage of the Reform Act, the 
Reform Act's remedies are confined to injunctive relief so the number 
of law suits would not be extreme.IS8 Furthermore, it is likely that 
small businesses with limited resources will sue only when there is a 
clear violation of the statute because it is not cost effective to sue 
when the violation is borderline and success is questionable.189 
2. Certification 
The amendment of the judicial review provisions of the RF A 190 also 
would work to permit judicial review of an agency's decision to exer-
to the outright repeal of § 611, the proposal of § 313 of the Reform Act has very similar 
consequences to an outright repeal because the end result of both proposals is that judicial 
review would be available. See id; Reform Act, supra note 18, § 313. The Reform Act simply 
defines more specifically how judicial review will work when challenges are brought because of 
noncompliance with the RFA. See Reform Act, supra note 18, § 31l. 
lXl See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 6 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). There would be little 
incentive to sue unnecessarily as plaintiffs could seek only injunctive relief, and there would be 
little chance of recovering attorney's fees, or compensatory or punitive damages. [d. (testimony 
of Rep. Ewing). 
182 [d. (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
1"'1 See id. (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
184 [d. (testimony of Rep. Ewing). It should also be noted that both the Reform Act and the 
Senate's bill would only permit challenges to final rules issued after the bill is enacted. Reform 
Act, supra note 18, § 311(b); S. 343 § 2(b)(2). Therefore, the number of suits created by the 
reforms may not increase as long as the agencies follow RFA procedures upon passage of the 
amendments. 
185 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 6 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
186 See 126 CONGo REC. 21,457 (1980) (statement of Sen. Culver). 
187 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 6 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
188 See id. (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
189 See id. (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
190 Discussed supra Part II.C.l. 
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cise the certification option. l9l With full judicial review, affected enti-
ties could challenge the final agency rules based on incorrect certifica-
tions, even if the final rule is not arbitrary or capricious on its face or 
as applied to all regulated entities, large or small,192 Under current 
RFA law, plaintiffs must challenge regulations under the APA's arbi-
trary and capricious standards.193 If, however, small businesses could 
challenge the certification decision under the RFA, the application of 
the regulation to small businesses could be improved by the adoption 
of regulatory alternatives, even though the regulation might be oth-
erwise acceptable.194 
Advocates of amending the RFA's judicial review provision point 
out that the amendment also would encourage more responsible de-
cisionmaking by the agencies.195 When a small business challenges an 
agency rule due to a flawed certification decision, a court's remedy 
would be to require the performance of a regulatory flexibility analy-
sis.196 The performance of the regulatory flexibility analysis would 
improve agency rulemaking by requiring the agency to identify and 
consider regulatory alternatives.197 As noted previously, the amount 
of litigation over incorrect certifications would likely decrease rapidly 
as agencies, courts, and the administrative law bar learn the bounda-
ries of permissible actions.19s 
3. Consideration of Indirect Effects 
Although no challenge to the lack of consideration of indirect effects 
of regulations has been raised in any court since Mid- Tex Electric 
Cooperative, Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,199 
small-business advocates have voiced concerns that the exclusion of 
indirect effects gives many agencies a solid loophole to evade the 
requirements of the RFA, and that entirely excluding indirect effects 
191 See Reform Act, supra note 18, § 311. The Reform Act provides that courts may overturn 
an agency's certification decision and require the agency to perform a FRFA if the decision is 
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Id. 
192 See id. 
19:< See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text. 
194 See Freedman, supra note 2, at 441--43; Verkuil, supra note 4, at 229. 
195 See 141 CONGo REC. H2407 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Ike Skelton (D-Mo.)). 
1% Reform Act, supra note 18, § 311. 
197 See Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-354, § 2(b), 94 Stat. 1164, 1165 (1980). 
198 See supra notes 179-85 and accompanying text. 
Hl9 773 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
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deprives the RFA of its utility as a protector of small entities.20o The 
Reform Act does not address the issue of indirect effects.201 
A previous version of the current Reform Act explicitly required 
the consideration of indirect effects.202 A separate House of Repre-
sentatives bill that had no provision for the consideration of indirect 
effects replaced the prior version in its entirety.203 The replacement 
bill constitutes the Reform Act as passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives and as sent to the Senate. The House of Representatives 
gave no explanation for the failure to include indirect effects in the 
version of the Reform Act it adopted.204 
4. Increased Role of the Office of Advocacy 
Although specifically named in the RFA as the entity charged with 
monitoring agency compliance with the RFA, the CCA largely has 
failed to be an effective enforcement mechanism.205 To ensure the 
effective use of the amicus power granted to the CCA by Congress 
in the RFA, the Reform Act adds a "sense of Congress" provision to 
the RFA.206 The sense of Congress provision reiterates Congress's 
intention that the CCA can appear as amicus in any action for pur-
poses of reviewing a rule.207 
The Reform Act also seeks to strengthen the role of the CCA by 
clarifying the procedure to be followed when the CCA disagrees with 
an agency certification or analysis.208 The bill adds a new subsection 
(d) to § 612 of the RFA entitled "Action by the SBA Chief Counsel 
for Advocacy" and would require agencies to provide the CCA with 
a copy of all proposed rules, § 605(b) certifications, and IRFAs no later 
than thirty days before the planned publication of the document in 
the Federal Register.209 The CCA must then review the proposed rule, 
200 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 11 (testimony of Doris S. Freedman). 
201 See Reform Act, supra note 18, §§ 301-13. 
202 See H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 8, 1995) (version 1). 
203 141 CONGo REC. H2617, H2630 (daily ed. Mar. 3,1995). 
204 See id. at H2636 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1995). 
205 See supra notes 158-65 and accompanying text. 
206 Reform Act, supra note 18, § 313. The provision states: "[ilt is the sense of Congress that 
the [CCAl should be permitted to appear as amicus curiae in any action or case brought in a 
court of the United States for the purpose of reviewing a rule." Id. As noted supra note 166, 
the Senate's bill to amend the RFA only addresses the judicial review provisions, and therefore 
it does not have a similar sense of Congress provision. 
207 See Reform Act, supra note 18, § 313. 
206 Id. § 312(a). 
209Id. 
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IRFA, or certification, and return a written statement to the agency 
concerning the proposed rule's effect on small entities no later than 
fifteen days before the scheduled pUblication.21O The agency must 
publish the CCA's statement of effect, together with the agency's 
response and the proposed rule at the time of the notice of proposed 
rulemaking.211 
The provisions in the Reform Act enable the CCA to assume the 
role that Congress intended. These provisions, together with the 
judicial review provisions, should encourage increased agency compli-
ance with the RFA.212 One commentator, however, noted that the 
additional reporting requirements imposed on the CCA by the Re-
form Act may be difficult to fulfill completely, given the limited re-
sources of the CCA.21:l 
5. Shortcomings of the Proposed Legislation and Possible 
Alternatives 
Some small-business advocates suggest that agencies should con-
sider the comments of small entities when certifying their proposed 
rules.214 To ensure comments from small entities, Congress could 
broaden the scope of § 609 to require an agency to solicit comments 
before the agency determines the impact of a rule or indicates that a 
rule will not affect small entities.215 This change could alleviate some 
concerns about increased litigation arising from expanded judicial 
review by encouraging communication and sharing of ideas, which is 
one of the goals of the RFA.216 The ability of the public to respond to 
the certification decision could force agencies not to rely on boiler-
plate language to try to escape the RFA, and to explore the true 
210 [d. 
211 [d. There are exceptions from the statement of effect procedures for rules issued by "an 
appropriate federal banking agency (as that term is defined in ... 12 U.S.C. § 1813(Q)), the 
National Credit Union Administration, or the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight" 
when any of those entities issue rules relating to implementing monetary policy, ensuring the 
safety of federal monetary institutions, or protecting federal deposit insurance funds. [d. 
212 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 58 (statement entitled "Why Should the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act be Amended?"). 
213 141 CONGo REC. H2410 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. JohnJ. LaFalce (D-N.Y.». 
214 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 23 (testimony of William S. Busker, Senior Vice 
President for Law and Finance, and General Counsel and Chief Financial Officer, The American 
Trucking Associations, Inc.). 
215 See id. (testimony of William S. Busker). 
216 See 1992 STUDY, supra note 40, at 11. 
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impact of the rules they promulgate.217 Commentators recognize that 
agency rulemakings tend to be more effective and easier to apply 
when agencies explore all possible alternatives at an early stage in 
the rule-making process, thereby developing and considering the al-
ternatives together with a rule as a whole.218 
D. Analysis of the Proposed Legislative Amendments 
The Reform Act is an important step in reinstating the RF A as the 
catalyst to change agency consideration of small-business compliance 
problems.219 The judicial review provision should encourage more re-
sponsible rulemaking without unnecessarily disrupting the rule-mak-
ing process.220 Similarly, small businesses could challenge incorrect 
certifications even though they could not comment on those decisions 
at the time they are made.221 Furthermore, the Reform Act may help 
solidify the CCA as the appropriate enforcement mechanism for the 
RFA.222 However, the Reform Act fails to mandate the consideration 
of indirect effects.223 Although the Reform Act is a good start, there 
are further steps available. 
1. Judicial Review 
Achieving the original purposes of the RF A requires more exten-
sive judicial review. Current interpretations of the judicial review 
provision do not give adequate evidentiary weight to the IRFA and 
the FRFA, which are the main analytical components of the RFA. 
Furthermore, the Thompson v. Clark test regarding when an inade-
quate flexibility analysis can justify overturning a rule,224 is too vague 
to be applied meaningfully. First, the undefined "adjustment ... for 
217 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 5--6 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
218 See id. at 31 (statement of Rep. Peter G. Torkildsen (R-Mass.»; 1992 STUDY, supra note 
40, at 78. 
219 See Stewart, supra note 16, at 66. 
220 See 141 CONGo REc. H2407 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 1995) (statement of Rep. Skelton). 
221 See Reform Act, supra note 18, § 311. 
222 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 56 (section-by-section analysis of the Regulatory 
Flexibility Amendments Act of 1993). 
223 See Reform Act, supra note 18, §§ 301-13. 
224 See Thompson V. Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The test says if the agency 
"underestimate[s] the harm inflicted upon small business to such a degree that, when adjust-
ment is made for the error, that harm clearly outweighs the claimed benefits of the rule," the 
rule can be overturned. [d. 
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the error" language225 could cut off the only opportunity now available 
to a small-business plaintiff to challenge an agency's flexibility analy-
sis. Second, the test weighs the harm to one individual or entity 
against the overall good that the rule could achieve.226 This test suffers 
from an analytic deficiency because it compares what could be a very 
real burden on small entities-which might only compose a small 
percentage of the entire regulated population-against the benefit 
that could be achieved by regulating all one hundred percent of the 
affected entities-which often includes both large and small entities.227 
Small business would almost always lose in this type of comparison. 
The comparison causes a failure to consider realistically small-busi-
ness concerns, thus frustrating a central goal of the RF A. 
The lack of judicial review has been the most significant obstacle to 
successful application of the RFA.228 Commentators argue that the 
amendment of § 611 will ensure that agencies complete the flexibility 
analyses by threatening the agencies with judicial review of the very 
analyses the agencies prepare.229 Although the Reform Act proposal 
to amend the judicial review provisions does not protect the agencies 
against disruptions of their rule-making processes to the same extent 
that the RFA currently does, the Reform Act does limit the availabil-
ity of judicial review to one year after the effective date of the final 
rule.230 The Reform Act proposal also limits the period during which 
the agency must correct any default to ninety days,231 thus encourag-
ing timely compliance and facilitating the prompt completion of the 
rule-making process. Furthermore, the "balance" originally struck by 
Congress between the need for oversight and the need not to disrupt 
agency rulemaking strongly favored the latter need.232 Based on the 
obvious inadequacies of the RF A in implementation, a new balance 
that provides for some true judicial oversight, as well as protection 
against paralysis of the rule-making process makes sense. 
225 [d. 
226 See id. 
227 See 1992 STUDY, supra note 40, at 70-71. 
228 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 5 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
229 See id. at 112 n.6 (statement of Doris S. Freedman). 
230 See Reform Act, supra note 18, § 311. 
231 See id. 
232 126 CONGo REc. 21,457 (1980) (statement of Sen. Culver). 
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2. Certification 
Section 605(b) creates a large loophole for agency compliance by 
nullifying the IRFA and FRFA requirements if agencies decide to 
certify.233 Courts have interpreted the section nonsensically, holding 
that even when an agency fails to perform any regulatory flexibility 
analysis, only a failure to respond to public comments justifies over-
turning a rule.284 The agency's certification, however, is not reviewable 
by courts and is valid pursuant to § 609 even if the agency fails to 
solicit public comments.235 Furthermore, the certification is sufficient 
under the "succinct statement" standard if the certification merely 
alleges no impact on small entities.236 In effect, courts appear to ignore 
the requirements of notice and comment, which are an integral part 
of responsible administrative rulemaking.237 This is completely at odds 
with the purposes of the RFA-heightened awareness by agencies of 
the needs of small business and greater interaction between small 
entities and the agencies that regulate them.238 It would be in the best 
interest of the agency and the small entities if agencies performed 
regulatory flexibility analyses even when the RFA does not require 
the analyses, so as to achieve more efficient and rational rulemaking.239 
2:l:l See Verkuil, supra note 4, at 241. 
234 See Colorado ex rei. Colorado State Banking Bd. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 926 F.2d 931, 
948 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Michigan v. Thomas, 805 F.2d 176, 188 (6th Cir. 1986». 
2:l5 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 609, 611. 
2:36 See, e.g., Colorado v. RTC, 926 F.2d at 948. In this case, the court upheld the RTC's 
certification decision when it simply alleged no impact. The RTC's statement, in its entirety, 
read: 
Id. 
[t]he basis for the RTC's certification is its determination that the rule will not impose 
compliance requirements on depository institutions of any size. It imposes no perform-
ance standards, no fees, no reporting or recordkeeping criteria, nor any other type of 
restriction or requirement with which depository institutions must comply. Thus, it 
does not have the type of economic impact addressed by the RFA. 
237 The case of Colorado v. RTC demonstrates the court's willingness to sustain an agency's 
certification decision even when little explanation is given by the agency. See id. 
2a8 See Freedman, supra note 2, at 442; 1992 STUDY, supra note 40, at 11. 
239 See 1992 STUDY, supra note 40, at 12. The EPA has adopted new internal guidelines for 
the implementation of the RFA that require flexibility analyses whenever there is any effect on 
small entities. OFFICE OF REGULATORY MGMT. & EVALUATION AND OFFICE OF POLICY, PLAN-
NING, AND EVALUATION, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA GUIDELINES FOR 
IMPLEMENTING THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT 4 (Rev. ed. Apr. 1992) [hereinafter EPA 
GUIDELINES]. The Guidelines are discussed in detail infra notes 317-21, and accompanying text. 
The legislative history indicates that the rationale behind performing flexibility analyses and 
considering regulatory alternatives even when not statutorily required to do so is in the agency's 
interest because the amount of resources expended in determining the extent of the impact and 
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The proposal in the Reform Act to amend the judicial review pro-
vision will solve much of the problem presented by allowing agencies 
to remove their rules from the RF A's special analysis requirements 
through certification. Analytically, courts classify the certification de-
cision as a determination of the RFA's applicability to the rule, which 
§ 611(a) removes from review by courts.240 The amendment of the 
judicial review section of the RFA could increase the amount of liti-
gation over agencies' certification decisions.241 Representative 
Thomas W. Ewing's statements respond to this possibility by suggest-
ing that the number of suits will not be large and will decline quickly.242 
Even if litigation increases, the ability of small entities to challenge 
certifications is wholly consistent with one of the key purposes of the 
RFA-to facilitate communication between the regulated and the 
regulator.243 Furthermore, the Reform Act amendment to judicial re-
view of RFA actions would permit only the review of interim actions 
such as certifications after the rule becomes final.244 Thus, the Reform 
Act would minimize further the possible disruption to the rule-making 
process. 
A suggestion of this author is to amend § 605(b) to require a cer-
tification decision at or before the time an agency publishes the notice 
of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register. Section 605(b) cur-
rently permits the publication of a certification decision either at the 
time of publication of the notice of proposed rulemaking or at the time 
of pUblication of a final rule.245 However, if the certification were 
provided concurrently with the notice of proposed rulemaking, small 
entities would have an opportunity to present their concerns to the 
agency while the rulemaking is proceeding rather than after the fact. 
In order to allow agency flexibility, the RFA should authorize the 
agency to later rescind its certification decision, or to certify at a 
subsequent time, but only if the agency can show that it has acquired 
new information or that the purpose or scope of the rulemaking has 
changed such that small entities are no longer implicated. By requir-
the number of affected entities are likely to be greater than those required to simply consider 
feasible alternatives. See 126 CONGo REC. 21,456 (1980) (statement of Sen. Culver). 
240 See, e.g., American Mining Congress v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 771 (9th Cir. 1992); Thompson 
v. Clark, 741 F.2d 401, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
241 See supra notes 179-85 and accompanying text. 
242 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 6 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
243 See Freedman, supra note 2, at 442. 
244 Reform Act, supra note 18, § 31lo 
245 5 U.S.C. § 605(b). 
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ing an early certification decision, the agency would be required to 
focus on the flexibility issues early on, when key policy issues are 
being decided.246 
In addition to the amendment to the judicial review provision to 
deter agency over-reliance on certification, small-business advocates 
have also suggested that § 609 of the RF A should be amended to 
require the solicitation of public comment on the certification deci-
sion.247 Allowing the public to comment could force agencies to per-
form true analyses and not to rely on boiler-plate language.248 The use 
of boiler-plate language is inconsistent with the policy of the RFA to 
increase agency response to small entity demands because boiler-
plate language effectively robs both the CCA and the public of the 
opportunity to point out any inaccuracies in the agency's position or 
to petition the agency to amend its decision. Furthermore, boiler-
plate language that fails to give a basis for the certification arguably 
violates § 605(b),s "succinct statement" requirement.249 
Amending the certification process to require that agencies provide 
notice of all proposed rulemaking concurrently with certification 
would allow potentially affected entities to provide comments to the 
agency about the potential effect of the proposed rule on them. De-
spite concerns that the ability to comment on certification decisions 
could slow the regulatory process, it is generally recognized that 
earlier and broader inputs provide the greatest benefits to the regu-
latory process.250 If the certification decision were subjected to notice 
and comment concurrently with the development of the rule, the 
agencies could improve the regulation by tailoring the alternatives 
and the regulation to more appropriately fit one another, rather than 
simply adding an alternative at the end of the process that is not fully 
consonant with the regulatory scheme.251 Similarly, agencies could cut 
costs and achieve more efficient rulemaking by consulting with inter-
ested parties.252 Finally, opening the certification decisions to public 
notice and comment would result in greater compliance by small 
businesses who could feasibly comply with the regulatory alternative 
246 See 1992 STUDY, supra note 40, at 93. 
247 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 23, 31 (statement of Rep. Torkildsen). 
248 See id. at 5--6 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
249 See 5 U.S.C. § 605(b). 
250 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 31 (statement of Rep. Torkildsen). 
251 See 1992 STUDY, supra note 40, at 78. 
252 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 31 (testimony of Rep. Torkildsen). 
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and who would feel better about complying since they had a voice in 
the development of the alternative. 
3. Consideration of Indirect Effects 
Many regulations that place a burden on small entities by burden-
ing an entity upon which small businesses are dependent have evaded 
flexibility analysis in the past.253 Despite the fact that such regulations 
do not directly regulate small businesses, agencies must recognize 
that the regulations still place a burden on small businesses because 
of the cumulative regulatory effect.254 In the case of an indirect effect, 
the small business still bears the true cost of the regulation because 
the regulated entity indirectly passes the cost to the small entity.255 
As indirect regulatory effects can impact small entities greatly, the 
RF A should be amended to require consideration of indirect effects 
in the flexibility analyses. Such an amendment would clarify further 
which rulemakings must abide by the RF A's requirements. Requiring 
consideration of indirect effects is also consistent with the RF A's 
overarching purpose of reducing the burdens on small entities of 
complying with federal regulations.256 
Although requiring consideration of indirect effects does place an 
additional burden on the agency, the agency can look to the purpose 
of the RFA257 to determine which indirect effects actually fall within 
its coverage. The RF A's standard language ;'significant impact on a 
substantial number of small entities"258 can help guide the agencies to 
recognize that some impacts although imposed on one entity realisti-
cally will fall on a substantial number of small entities due to the 
realities of the marketplace. For example, a regulation such as the 
off-road farm equipment emissions regulation promulgated by the 
EPA259 is an indirect effect that has as significant an effect as if the 
EPA had directly regulated those small entities that purchase the 
equipment.260 Admittedly, not all indirect effects should be analyzed 
by agencies. An attenuated effect would not fall within the scope of 
the RF A, but there are some "indirect" effects that are so easily 
253 See id. at 11 (testimony of Doris S. Freedman). 
254 See id. at 14 (testimony of James Morrison). 
255 See id. at 11 (testimony of Doris S. Freedman). 
256 See Freedman, supra note 2, at 442-43. 
257 See Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-354, § 2(b), 94 Stat. 1164, 1165 (1980). 
258 E.g., 5 U.S.C. § 602. 
259 See supra notes 143-47 and accompanying text. 
260 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 7 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
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recognized and linked to the regulation that consideration of those 
effects by the agency is appropriate. 
4. Increased Role of the Office of Advocacy 
The RFA, as originally crafted, gave the CCA a special role in 
enforcing its provisions.261 In practice, however, courts' refusal to 
recognize fully the CCA's powers has hampered the CCA.262 Although 
the sense of Congress provision in the Reform Act263 certainly does 
not free the CCA from potential constitutional challenge similar to 
the DOJ's position in Lehigh Valley Farmers v. Block, it does clarify 
congressional intent on this issue.264 The supportive stance of Con-
gress may encourage the CCA to reassert itself and to take an active 
stance on behalf of small entities. 
The CCA's activities could become an important aspect of RFA law 
if judicial review is permitted.265 The involvement of the CCA could 
facilitate litigation by providing experience and expertise on small-
business issues to the court proceedings. Also, the mere existence of 
the CCA's power to intervene could cause more agencies to abide by 
the CCA's recommendations at an early stage in the rule-making 
process, which could, in turn, reduce the incidence of litigation and 
more fully achieve the RFA's purposes.266 
Similarly, the statement of effect provision of the Reform Act267 
should encourage the CCA to assume a more active stance as one of 
the primary enforcement mechanisms. The Reform Act proposal of a 
statement of effect procedure could, however, go much further toward 
improving the RF A. The current proposal simply would alert the 
public that reads the Federal Register to the fact that the CCA is 
opposed to an agency action.268 Therefore, the proposal's usefulness 
261 See Stewart, supra note 16, at 67. 
262 See supra Part ILEA. 
263 Reform Act, supra note 18, § 313; see supra notes 206--07 and accompanying text. 
264 See Reform Act, supra note 18, § 313. The DOJ claims that Congress does not have the 
constitutional authority to vest the CCA with the amicus power without the approval of the 
Attorney General because it would interfere with the Executive branch's ability to fulfill its own 
constitutional functions. See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 56 (section-by-section analysis of 
the Regulatory Flexibility Amendments Act of 1993); Freedman, supra note 2, at 450 nA1. As 
the CCA has never pursued this position, the constitutionality of the RFA's amicus provision 
remains unclear. 
265 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 7 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
266 See id. at 6-7 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
267 See supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text. 
266 See Reform Act, supra note 18, § 312. 
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may be limited to small businesses that regularly check the Federal 
Register. Thus, it may be useful to expand the RFA's procedures for 
gathering comments to ensure that the CCA's opposition to proposed 
rulemakings is also publicized in trade magazines that small busi-
nesses are more likely to read.269 
Although the Reform Act requires the agency to respond to the 
statement of effect, the Reform Act puts no affirmative duty on the 
agency to change its rulemaking or to incorporate the CCA's com-
ments.270 Requiring agencies to respond to and collaborate with the 
CCA during the rule-making process would improve the quality of 
rulemaking by assuring compliance with the RFA from the outset.271 
Although the statement of effect is a first step, placing a more affir-
mative duty on agencies to comply with the CCA's suggestions would 
strengthen the provision. 
The RF A has suffered in implementation due to statutory ambigu-
ity and judicial interpretation. The passage of the Reform Act, how-
ever, could be an important step in restoring the RF A as a protection 
against disproportionately burdensome regulation of small busi-
nesses. Despite the need for the provisions contained in the Reform 
Act, there may be a need for further amendment of the RFA, even if 
Congress adopts the Reform Act. 
III. THE EPA AS AN EXAMPLE OF REGULATORY ACTION UNDER 
THE RFA 
Since its creation in 1970, Congress has charged the EPA with 
direct administrative responsibility for a variety of legislative envi-
ronmental protection schemes.272 Due to the substantive breadth and 
complexity of these schemes, the EPA has developed numerous areas 
269 Section 609 of the RFA requires agencies to publicize proposed rulemakings in trade 
magazines and through public hearings when the proposed rulemaking will have a significant 
impact on a substantial number of small entities. 5 U.S.C. § 609. Extending the § 609 require-
ments to include the publication of the CCA's opposition to a proposed rulemaking would 
increase the number of small businesses that could respond to and participate in the rulemaking. 
See also supra notes 214--18 and accompanying text. 
270 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 200-01 (statement of Leo McDonough). 
271 See id. (statement of Leo McDonough). 
272 E.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liability Act of 1980,42 U.S.C. § 9601 
(1988 & Supp. v 1993); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1988 & Supp. v 1993); Toxic Substances 
Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601--02 (1988 & Supp. v 1993); Federal Insecticide Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
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of expertise.273 The EPA, like other agencies, facilitates its administra-
tion of statutory schemes by promulgating rules.274 The promulgation 
of these rules, to the extent it affects small businesses, must comply 
with the requirements of the RFA.275 In order to evaluate effectively 
whether the EPNs rule-making process complies with the RFA, this 
section first explores the EPNs internal rule-making process and the 
roles of the important participants in that process. This information, 
together with an understanding of the EPNs record of compliance or 
noncompliance with the RF A, form the basis for suggestions to im-
prove that record. 
A. The EPA Rule-making Process 
1. The EP Ns Organizational Structure 
To effectively fulfill its rule-making responsibilities under each en-
vironmental protection scheme, the EPA has developed lead offices 
such as Solid Waste, Toxic Substances, and Drinking Water, each of 
which supervises different environmental concerns.276 No individual 
within the EPA has adequate knowledge to promulgate a rule inde-
pendently, rather, a team of individuals from the various lead offices 
affected by a rule works together to promulgate a rule by expressing 
the concerns of their respective offices and reaching a compromise.277 
These teams are called "working groups" and are created by the 
EPA Steering Committee.278 Although one lead office is technically in 
charge of the rule-making process and the working group is meant to 
assist that office, the working group is charged independently with 
273 Thomas O. McGarity, Internal Structure of EPA Rulemaking, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1991, at 60. 
274 See id. 
275 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12. 
276 See McGarity, supra note 273, at 70. 
277 See id. at 61, 90. 
278 See id. at 72. The Steering Committee includes representatives from each Assistant Ad-
ministrator and from the general counsel. Id. at 69. Assistant Administrators are divided into 
those with programmatic responsibilities-administrators charged with approving the sub-
stance of regulations-and those with functional responsibilities-administrators charged with 
agency enforcement or management. See id. at 65, 66 & nn.23-24. These individuals are ap-
pointed, and the subject matter areas of responsibility change over time. See id. at 65-66. The 
Steering Committee, which is composed of high level representatives from the numerous 
departments within the EPA, coordinates the EPNs regulation promulgation activities. See id. 
at 69. 
238 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 23:203 
resolving conflicts among the competing interests and ensuring the 
adequacy of the rulemaking.279 The working group, acting pursuant to 
the lead office's direction, also is charged with conducting and assess-
ing any regulatory impact analyses, including the regulatory flexibil-
ity analyses prepared pursuant to the RFA.280 
The team approach creates recognizable benefits to the rule-making 
process. The compromise reached by representatives of various EPA 
divisions can result in the most well-rounded rule and a wider array 
of regulatory options.281 The team approach also somewhat reduces 
delay in the rule-making process by bringing representatives from all 
affected areas together at once,282 rather than having each area sepa-
rately attempt to promulgate a rule that could be acceptable to all. 
This framework, however, is somewhat inefficient because numer-
ous people all focus on the same rule. Inefficiency can result when a 
large number of people collaborate on a rule, making it more difficult 
to achieve an acceptable result.283 The rule-making process suffers 
because it takes longer to educate the participants and to build con-
sensus among the competing interests.284 Moreover, one commentator 
has noted that the team approach results in problems of account-
ability.285 Similarly, participation by representatives from each office 
affected by a rule requires a larger institution so that adequate par-
ticipation can be achieved for all the rules. 
2. The Role of the Asbestos and Small Business Ombudsman 
In 1983, the EPA created a Small Business Ombudsman (ASBO).286 
An ASBO representative serves on all working groups formed for 
279 See id. at 73-74. 
280 See id. at 75; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA's ASBESTOS AND SMALL BUSI-
NESS OMBUDSMAN REGULATORY ASSISTANCE 3 (1992) [hereinafter REGULATORY ASSIS-
TANCE]. 
281 See McGarity, supra note 273, at 91. 
282 See id. 
2&~ See id. 
284 See id. 
285 [d. at 91-92. The accountability problem arises because members of the working group are 
given deadlines by the chairperson, but in most instances the chairperson is not the member's 
boss. See id. The chairperson is, of course, free to complain to the member's boss, but more often 
the rule-making process continues without that member's input. See id. at 92. The result is that 
the lagging member is not reprimanded for the resulting delay when the member's office later 
raises the objections the member should have raised. See id. 
286 REGULATORY ASSISTANCE, supra note 280, at 8. The current Small Business Ombudsman 
is Karen V. Brown. [d. at 3. She is also the EPA's Asbestos Ombudsman. [d. at 2. Hence, the 
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rules that will affect small entities, and therefore must satisfy the 
requirements of the RFA.287 The ASBO also informs affected small 
business trade associations and organizations of the EPA's proposed 
rulemakings in order to fulfill the RFA's § 609 solicitation of comments 
requirement.288 After providing comments about the rulemaking to 
the working group, the ASBO continues to serve as an advocate for 
small entities in the rule-making process "to the extent possible con-
sidering the potential environmental consequences."289 
The ASBO reviews all proposed regulations but, due to limited 
resources, directly monitors only those regulations that it determines 
are likely to have the greatest adverse impact on small entities.290 
While this process appears to be an effective way of alerting the 
working group to small-business concerns and of bringing EPA rules 
in line with the RFA requirements, the success of the ASBO repre-
sentatives in influencing rulemaking has been less than stellar.291 For 
example, in 1993, the ASBO directly monitored twenty-two rulemak-
ings, and only had a significant effect on eight to ten of those rules.292 
Even though success requires taking one step at a time, the ASBO's 
role in the rule-making process seems less influential than one would 
imagine, given that many view the EPA as a leader in compliance with 
the RFA.293 In addition to the fact that only a small percentage of 
monitored rules were actually affected, the ASBO only chose those 
rules the ASBO deemed most likely to have an adverse impact on 
office she holds is referred to as the Asbestos and Small Business Ombudsman [hereinafter 
ASBO). Although she holds the title of ASBO, she is also the head of a department that 
accomplishes the work discussed in this Part III.A.2. In addition to Ms. Brown, there are five 
ASBO representatives (one Deputy Ombudsman and four Ombudsman Staff Assistants) who 
work to fulfill the mission of the ASBO. [d. There are also small business liaisons in each region 
who are available for questions regarding compliance with the Clean Air Act. ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY, SMALL BUSINESS OMBUDSMAN MEMORANDUM 1, 3 (Jan. 1995) [herein-
after SBO MEMORANDUM). 
287 See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE, supra note 280, at 3. 
288 See id. 
2"9 [d. at 4. In application, this has meant that the ASBO can only assert itself when the small 
business concern does not override the overall EPA regulatory agenda and the anticipated 
environmental benefits of the rule. See infra notes 296-97 and accompanying text. 
290 See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE, supra note 280, at 5. 
291 See id. 
292 [d. The ASBO, however, did not define, or give an example of, what effects qualify as 
"significant effects" on the rules the ASBO monitored. [d. 
29:l See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 105 (statement of Doris S. Freedman); GAO REPORT, 
supra note 2, at 2 (noting the EPA has repeatedly been characterized as satisfying RFA's 
requirements). 
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small entities.294 Therefore, there could be a substantial number of 
rules that have an impact on small business-and are therefore sub-
ject to the RFA's analysis requirements-but which escape the 
influence of small-entity advocates at the critical early stages of prom-
ulgation. Regulatory commentators note that influence early in the 
rule-making process is crucial because once impetus builds behind an 
option, it becomes harder to divert attention to more effective op-
tions.295 
The ASBO is further hampered in its advocacy by the overall EPA 
agenda. The ASBO only can pursue small-business concerns "to the 
extent possible considering the potential environmental conse-
quences."296 This limitation suggests that small-business concerns eas-
ily can be overruled by other working group participants who believe 
the benefits to the environment from the proposed rule outweigh any 
small-business concerns.297 Although the EPA cannot disregard its 
legislative agenda of improving the environment in favor of small 
business, this broad standard gives the rest of the working group a 
large loophole by which it can disregard the ASBO's warnings and 
effectively disregard the requirements of the RFA. 
B. Actions Taken by the EPA to Deal with Small Businesses 
Many commentators have cited with approval the EPA's actions 
under the RFA.298 The EPA has also adopted some innovative 
schemes that are not required by the RFA to deal with small busi-
nesses.299 Despite the implementation of these measures, and the ex-
istence of a better compliance record than most agencies, being the 
best example among widespread noncompliance does not equal com-
pliance.3oo There are measures that the EPA could and should adopt 
to increase its compliance with the RFA. 
294 See REGULATORY ASSISTANCE, supra note 280 at 5. 
295 See 1992 STUDY, supra note 40, at 93, 95. 
296 REGULATORY ASSISTANCE, supra note 280, at 4. 
297 See McGarity, supra note 273, at 92 (arguing that the team approach can be a disadvantage 
to efficient rulemaking because of the coercive effect on individuals not to stand up for an 
unpopular proposal, which removes that proposal from upper-management consideration later 
in the rule-making process). 
29R See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 105 (statement of Doris S. Freedman); GAO REPORT, 
supra note 2, at 2. 
299 See infra Part III.B.l. 
300 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 10 (testimony of Doris S. Freedman). 
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1. EPA Policies Consistent with the Spirit of the RFA 
Although not specifically required by the RFA, the EPA has 
adopted some measures to lessen the compliance burden on small 
business.30l These measures evidence the EPA's attempts to satisfy 
the policies of the RFA. 
The most obvious example of an EPA policy that is consistent with 
the policies of, but not required by, the RFA is the ''bubble concept."302 
The bubble concept provides an alternative method of computing 
emissions, thereby minimizing the burden on all small entities that 
must comply with regulations designed to reduce emissions.303 The 
bubble concept permits the small entity to place a hypothetical ''bub-
ble" over an entire plant and measure the emissions from the whole 
plant rather than measuring emissions from each separate source 
within the plant.304 Thus, emissions are more easily measured and the 
small entity that must reduce emissions can do so on an overall basis 
rather than undertaking expensive renovations of each separate 
source.305 Other examples of EPA responsiveness to small-business 
concerns include small-business exemptions from certain EPA re-
quirements,306 a reduced-penalty policy for small governments and 
not-for-profit entities,307 and the development of State Small Business 
Ombudsman's and Technical Assistance Programs as required by the 
Clean Air Act Amendments to encourage small business compliance 
with the Clean Air Act.308 
Finally, the EPA recently announced the development of a new 
policy to assist small entities in increased compliance with all regula-
tory schemes.309 Although no final policy has been announced, the EPA 
stated that it intended to implement a "Compliance Assistance" pro-
gram before taking enforcement actions against small entities under 
301 Although the effect of the EPA's measures on small businesses is the concern of this 
Comment, some of the measures discussed infra also apply to other small entities. 
302 See Verkuil, supra note 4, at 226. 
303 See id. 
304 See id. 
305 See 126 CONGo REC. 21,455 (1980) (statement of Sen. Culver). 
306 E.g., EPA Small Business Rules, 40 C.F.R. § 21 (1994) (establishing procedures by which 
small businesses can be relieved of total compliance with water pollution rules). 
307 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE FOR CALCULATING MUNICIPAL AND 
NOT-FOR-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS' ABILITY TO PAY CIVIL PENALTIES USING CURRENT FUND 
BALANCES (Mar. 1993). 
308 SBO MEMORANDUM, supra note 286, at 1, 4. 
309 See More Use of 'Compliance Assistance' Planned by Enforcement Office, EPA Says, 24 
Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 51, at 2194-95 (Apr. 22, 1994) [hereinafter Compliance Assistance]. 
242 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 23:203 
environmental statutes.310 The proposed policy indicated that the EPA 
would conduct a compliance assistance visit to assess the entity's 
obligations and then give the entity a period of time to comply with 
the action, following up with an inspection at a later date.311 
The rationale behind the compliance assistance program is that 
enforcement has not always had the deterrent effect the EPA in-
tended.312 Scott C. Fulton, Deputy Assistant Administrator for En-
forcement at the EPA, noted that enforcement measures will still be 
applied, but primarily to larger entities that are capable of complying 
but lack the will to do SO.313 On the other hand, smaller entities that 
do not comply due to lack of information or resources to achieve 
compliance will be assisted by the EPA to achieve such compliance.314 
Although the program is still in the planning stages, the program is 
representative of the shift in focus of the EPA, since its 1993 restruc-
turing, toward compliance instead of enforcement.315 
As such a policy can benefit all entities, large and small, involved in 
the regulatory process, this policy should be made a high priority by 
the EPA. Postponing costly EPA penalties for noncompliance is a 
crucial first step toward fostering improved relations between the 
EPA and regulated entities. But the policy may be applied in an 
ad-hoc manner based on the individual agendas of EPA repre-
sentatives charged with the policy's implementation. The effective-
ness of the policy might be improved if there are clearly defined 
standards which the EPA representatives visiting the sites must 
apply. The development of standards would result in consistent appli-
cation of the policy and give small businesses predictability. Although 
this step would improve the flow of information to the small regulated 
entity, the policy does not necessarily ease the overall regulatory 
burden on such entities as required by the RF A. 
2. EPA Performance Under the RFA 
Numerous commentators have commended the EPA for its compli-
ance with the RFA.316 The EPA is among the few agencies to have 
310 See id. at 2194. 
311 See id. at 2195. 
312 See id. 
313 See id. at 2194-95. 
314 Compliance Assistance, supra note 309, at 2195. 
315 See id. 
316 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 105 (statement of Doris S. Freedman); GAO REPORT, 
supra note 2, at 2. 
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adopted internal guidelines for implementing the RFA.317 The agency 
has recently revised those guidelines in a manner that suggests the 
EPA supports the analysis of regulatory impacts on small entities in 
almost every case.31S 
The EPA's Revised Guidelines for Implementing the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act recognize that regulatory burdens on small entities not 
only exist, but that such burdens are likely to increase in the future.319 
Accordingly, the official position of the EPA is that "EPA will perform 
an IRFA and a FRFA for every rule subject to the Act that will have 
any economic impact, however small, on any small entities that are 
subject to the rule, however few, even though the Agency may not be 
legally required to do SO."320 The EPA adopted the new guidelines due 
to difficulties in determining the meaning of "significant" impacts and 
"substantial" numbers-the RFA standards governing when flexibil-
ity analyses must be prepared.321 
In spite of the promulgation of new agency-wide guidelines, exam-
ples of EPA noncompliance with RFA requirements still exist. For 
example, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion, and Liability Act322 requires all companies to comply with exten-
sive reporting procedures whenever anti-freeze is spilled.323 Even 
though anti-freeze is generally considered a mildly harmful chemical, 
small garages and auto shops are still required to report any spill to 
local, state, and federal entities.324 This reporting requirement reduces 
the efficiency of small business, who must incur substantial compli-
ance costs in meeting the reporting requirements, with only a minimal 
environmental benefit from the compliance with the regulation.325 The 
result of EPA overregulation in direct contradiction to its position 
that the RFA requires the examination of realistic alternatives to 
regulation.326 Representatives ofthe American Trucking Associations, 
Inc. are also concerned that the EPA ignores viable regulatory alter-
317 See Freedman, supra note 2 at 448 n.34. 
318 EPA GUIDELINES, supra note 239, at 4 (revising original guidelines published in 1982). 
319 Memorandum from F. Henry Habicht II, Deputy Administrator, EPA to EPA Administra-
tors 1 (Apr. 1992) [hereinafter Habicht Memorandum]. 
320 EPA GUIDELINES, supra note 239, at 4 (emphasis in original). 
321 See id.; 1992 STUDY, supra note 40, at 102; see also supra notes 129-30 and accompanying 
text (discussing the RFA's "significant impact" and "substantial number" language). 
322 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
323 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 22 (testimony of William S. Busker). 
324 See id. (testimony of William S. Busker). 
325 See id. (testimony of William S. Busker). 
326 EPA GUIDELINES, supra note 239, at 15. 
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natives that would protect small businesses from onerous regulations 
and still achieve the regulatory objective,327 which the EPA claims is 
an integral part of useful regulatory flexibility analysis.328 
Another example of the EPA's inadequate compliance with the 
RF A's goals is the agency's treatment of storm water run-off regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to the Clean Water Act.329 Pursuant to 
§ 605(b) of the RFA, the EPA certified that its rule requiring permits 
for industrial storm water discharge would not have a substantial 
impact on small entities.330 The EPA therefore did not prepare a 
regulatory flexibility analysis.331 The cost to companies trying to com-
ply with the rule, however, has far exceeded EPA estimates.332 Small-
business advocates assert that had a regulatory flexibility analysis 
been prepared, and had small businesses been consulted during prom-
ulgation of the rule, the severe understatement of actual costs might 
have been discovered, alternatives might have been developed, and 
much money could have been saved for both large and small entities.333 
The CCA has uncovered other problems with EPA compliance. The 
CCA regularly reviews all proposed rulemakings and issues com-
ments when the CCA believes the agency has failed to comply with 
RFA requirements.334 In 1992, the CCA reviewed numerous agency 
notifications of proposed rulemaking.335 Of the 260 rules proposed by 
the EPA in 1992, thirty were considered insufficient by the CCA, and 
the CCA wrote a comment letter for all thirty.336 Although full agency 
compliance is rarely expected, this represents greater than ten per-
cent noncompliance by the EPA. 
327 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 22 (testimony of William S. Busker). 
328 See EPA GUIDELINES, supra note 239, at 15. 
329 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 22 (testimony of William S. Busker). 
330 See id. (testimony of William S. Busker). 
331 [d. (testimony of William S. Busker). 
332 See id. (testimony of William S. Busker). The EPA estimated a cost of $17 to $1,000 per 
facility, but some companies have reported compliance costs in excess of $100,000. See id. 
(testimony of William S. Busker). 
333 See id. (testimony of William S. Busker). 
334 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 264 (letter from Doris S. Freedman, Acting Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy to Honorable John LaFalce, Chairman, ComInittee on Small Business, 
House of Representatives 1 (Aug. 1993». 
335 See id. (letter from Doris S. Freedman, Acting Chief Counsel for Advocacy to Honorable 
John LaFalce, Chairman, ComInittee on Small Business, House of Representatives). 
336 [d. (letter from Doris S. Freedman, Acting Chief Counsel for Advocacy to Honorable John 
LaFalce, Chairman, Committee on Small Business, House of Representatives). The letter from 
the CCA indicated that comment letters were written when the CCA "found a compliance error 
and/or deemed it within the best interests of small business to offer substantive comments 
regarding a particular rule." [d. (letter from Doris S. Freedman, Acting Chief Counsel for 
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The EPA has also been guilty of incorrectly certifying its regula-
tions as not having a disparate economic effect upon small entities.337 
The EPA certified storm water run-off regulations even though regu-
lating the discharge of storm water will certainly affect every indus-
try and cannot possibly be considered to have no effect on small 
entities.338 The EPA certified its off-road farm equipment emissions 
rule because no small entities manufacture the equipment and there-
fore the EPA found no resulting impact on small entities.339 Even 
though the RFA currently covers only direct effects and this certifica-
tion was therefore not illegal, this is a clear example of an indirect 
effect that any agency trying to comply in good faith with the RFA 
should consider.340 Even if no small business manufactures the equip-
ment, such equipment is mainly used by farmers, most of whom 
qualify as small entities under the RFA.341 
3. Analysis: What the EPA Can Do to Improve Its RFA Record 
These examples of noncompliance with the RF A's requirements and 
goals, even against an overall record of compliance, are especially 
troublesome because the EPA regulates small entities more than 
many other federal agencies.342 Therefore, it is especially important 
that the EPA take the lead in complying with the RFA. It is also 
essential that the EPA continue to refine and adapt its policies to 
remain consistent with the true objectives of the RFA. 
Advocacy to Honorable John LaFalce, Chairman, Committee on Small Business, House of 
Representatives). The thirty comment letters written to the EPA were not classified by ration-
ale, but examples of what the CCA considers a deficiency are ''inadequate certifications, inade-
quate [IRFAs], incorrect certifications, incorrect IRFAs, incorrect exemptions, cases in which 
[FRFAs] were not prepared, or references to the RFA were omitted altogether." [d. at n.1 
(letter from Doris S. Freedman, Acting Chief Counsel for Advocacy to Honorable John LaFalce, 
Chairman, Committee on Small Business, House of Representatives). 
337 See, e.g., American Mining Congress v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 772 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding 
the EP.Ns rule relating to storm water discharge rules for inactive mines even though the EPA 
certified the rule when "[i]t does appear that the EPA failed to understand the number of 
inactive mines covered by its rule"); see also supra notes 323-28 and accompanying text 
(discussing the EP.Ns rules relating to anti-freeze spills); supra notes 329-33 and accompanying 
text (discussing the EP.Ns industrial activity storm water discharge rules); supra notes 143-47 
and accompanying text (discussing the EP.Ns regulation of off-road farm equipment). 
338 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 22 (testimony of William S. Busker). 
339 See id. at 7 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
340 See id. (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
341 See 5 U.S.C. § 601(3) (defining small business); 13 C.F.R. § 121.601 (requiring annual re-
ceipts less than $0.5 million to qualify as "small" in the agricultural sector). 
342 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 26 (testimony of Doris S. Freedman); Verkuil, supra note 
4, at 221. 
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Some of the difficulties in the EPA's ability to address consistently 
small-business concerns undoubtedly arise from the method of EPA 
rulemaking. The team approach necessarily focuses on consensus.343 
Therefore, regardless of how large a role the ASBO representative 
plays in the rule-making process, a majority of representatives from 
other departments that do not want to lighten the compliance proce-
dures for small entities can still override the ASBO representative's 
point of view.344 Furthermore, commentators have criticized EPA 
rulemakings and analyses for reliance on inadequate figures.345 
Although the EPA Guidelines will likely increase the number of 
IRFAs and FRFAs actually prepared by the agency,346 the new policy 
still contains substantial loopholes. First, the policy only applies when 
entities are "subject to the rule."347 Thus, the EPA has specifically 
absolved itself and its lead offices of a duty to require any considera-
tion of indirect effects regardless of how obvious and significant those 
effects are. Although this approach is consistent with current case 
law,343 the approach appears inconsistent with the stated objective of 
the new policy-to improve the EPA's compliance with the RFA "even 
though the Agency may not be legally required to do SO."349 Therefore, 
just as Congress should amend the RFA to compel consideration of 
indirect effects, the EPA should also further amend its guidelines to 
direct lead offices to consider indirect effects on small entities when 
promulgating rules. 
Although the danger in considering indirect effects is that the 
rule-making processes could become paralyzed by the need to con-
sider every possible secondary effect in every industry, the RF A still 
only requires IRF As and FRF As when there are significant impacts 
on a substantial number of entities.35O Therefore, the EPA would not 
be required to consider every possible effect, as regulatory reform 
opponents may claim.351 Rather, by consulting in good faith with the 
regulated industries, the EPA could determine the largest secondary 
343 See supra notes 278--85 and accompanying text. 
344 See McGarity, supra note 273, at 92; see also supra note 297 and accompanying text. 
345 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 98 (statement of Rep. Roberts); 1992 STUDY, supra note 
40, at 70-72, 85. 
346 See Habicht Memorandum, supra note 319, at 2. 
347 EPA GUIDELINES, supra note 239, at 4. (emphasis added). 
348 See supra Part II.B.3. 
349 EPA GUIDELINES, supra note 239, at 4. 
350 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 603-04. 
351 See Mid-Tex Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 773 F.2d 327, 343 
(D.C. Cir. 1985). 
1995] REFORMING THE RFA AND EPA RULES 247 
effects of proposed rules without a significant increase in resource 
expenditure. 
A potential problem with the consideration of indirect effects is that 
such consideration, combined with the proposed amendment to the 
judicial review provision, could subject the EPA to lawsuits that may 
further impede the regulatory process.852 Although some suits would 
be filed immediately after the passage of an amendment to require 
consideration of indirect effects, such suits will quickly decrease in 
number as the EPA refines its rule-making policies and as a general 
understanding of which kinds of secondary effect must be analyzed 
under the RFA is achieved.853 
Another problem with the EPA Guidelines is that the lead offices 
have too much discretion as to how much of their resources should be 
expended in performing IRFAs and FRFAs.854 Although the EPA 
Guidelines explain the RFA's requirements for the content of the 
IRFA and FRFA in detail,355 there is little explanation of how exten-
sive the lead office's analysis must be.356 This approach could result in 
lead offices allocating minimal resources to the flexibility analyses. 
This approach is dangerous because if the existing facts are not thor-
oughly analyzed for their validity and specific applicability to the rule 
under consideration, the adequacy and utility of the flexibility analysis 
will be seriously undermined.357 The EPA does make the level of 
regulatory flexibility analysis dependent upon the severity of the 
effect on small businesses, thus the approach recognizes that there 
must be at least a minimal consideration of small entity impacts for 
every rule.358 However, the EPA should rewrite the Guidelines to give 
lead offices less discretion and more direction on how to evaluate and 
weigh each of the factors. 
352 See 1993 Hearing, supra note 9, at 6 (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
:158 See id. (testimony of Rep. Ewing). 
354 See EPA GUIDELINES, supra note 239, at 4 (describing the discretion given to each lead 
office). 
355 See id. at 11-18,21 (listing IRFA and FRFA content requirements). 
356 The EPA Guidelines state: 
[s]ubject to these minimum requirements of the [RFA], lead offices have wide latitude 
in determining the level of analysis appropriate, based on the following considerations: 
(1) the severity of a rule's anticipated impact on small entities that are subject to the 
rule; (2) the quality and quantity of available data; and (3) the level of resources 
available for the analysis. 
[d. at 11. 
357 See 1992 STUDY, supra note 40, at 85 (noting that the EPA's use of averaged and aggre-
gated data often seriously misstates the potential impact of the rule). 
8511 See id. at 102. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In order to restore the RFA as the protector of small businesses 
against governmental overregulation and the facilitator of communi-
cation between the regulator and the regulated, the RF A must be 
amended. The proposals of the Reform Act are a necessary first step, 
but they too could prove inadequate in implementation. If the avail-
ability of judicial review causes undue litigation without improving 
rulemakings, or if the CCA is unable to become the enforcement 
mechanism anticipated in the RFA, further revisions to the RFA may 
be necessary. Should the Reform Act fail to achieve the RFA's original 
goals, there are other steps which could be taken, including providing 
for public comments on agency certifications and requiring certifica-
tions concurrent to the notice of proposed rulemaking. 
It is likely, however, that the amendments proposed in the Reform 
Act will achieve a more desirable balance between the interests of 
small businesses and the interests of regulatory agencies without 
impeding the rule-making process. The current provisions have been 
advanced by small business advocates for years, and are therefore the 
result of extensive collaboration and perfection by experts. The pas-
sage of the Reform Act will not only give the small-business sector 
the opportunity to continue to thrive and contribute significantly to 
the United States economy, but also will ensure that agencies will 
observe greater compliance with regulations and possibly save on 
enforcement costs. 
In the spirit of the Reform Act, the EPA should further examine 
its rule-making process and expand its efforts to improve any rule-
making which affects small businesses. Not only could the EPA revise 
its guidelines, but it could also improve its data collection and rule 
promulgation practices. 
Society as a whole will benefit from clearer and simpler environ-
mental regulations. Even more, the EPA and the environment itself 
will benefit from the revision of the EPA Guidelines because regula-
tory compliance options will be more fully explored, thereby allowing 
small entities to more readily comply. This will achieve a better un-
derstanding and improved working relationship between the EPA 
and the affected industries. Such a relationship will create even 
greater communication, further easing the EPA's difficulties in deter-
mining indirect effects by opening the flow of information between 
the regulator and the regulated. 
